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The belief in the constitutional right of parents to con-
trol the upbringing of their children and a right to academic
freedom for public school teachers persistently remains a part
of American education thought. Yet there appears to have
developed no fully agreed upon theory to explain these twin
rights, and they have occasionally come under severe attack.
Oregon in the 1920s sought to abolish the right of parents to
send their children to private schools, an effort successfully
resisted in the Supreme Court.' Though this opinion was to
have settled the issue, the controversy continues for two im-
portant reasons. The approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion used in the opinion-a noninterpretist approach'-has
been attacked and the opinion criticized as wrongly decided.8
Furthermore, the Court has rejected its use of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment in that and other
opinions of the era.4 As for academic freedom, the Supreme
Court has not recognized a constitutional right that protects
the public school teacher's discretion to control the content
of the curriculum contrary to the preferences of superiors.6
* Professor of Education and Political Science; Chairman, Social Con-
text, Graduate School of Education, University of Rochester. A.B. 1962,
Princeton University; J.D. 1965, Northwestern University School of Law;
Ed.D. 1972, Harvard Graduate School of Education.
1. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2. See infra text accompanying note 196.
3. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IN-
DIANA L.J. 1, 11 (1971).
4. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 330 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
5. See text accompanying note 257 infra.
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Furthermore, Professor Goldstein has argued that if the
function of public schools is to inculcate, it follows that public
school teachers should not be afforded the right to academic
freedom. Recognition of such a right could frustrate the
state's interest in providing the inculcation of pupils in the
values and ideals preferred by the state."
It is necessary to address the question of whether the
Constitution protects the right of parents to control the up-
bringing of their children and the right of academic freedom
for public elementary and secondary school teachers. To the
extent these rights are protected and given a broad interpre-
tation, the authority of the government is limited in control-
ling the upbringing of children.
To support a new rationale for a parental right to edu-
cate and a teacher's right to academic freedom, this paper
examines the American public education tradition, the func-
tioning of public schools and the role of government in edu-
cation. The second section examines constitutional doctrine
and the authority of the state to inculcate pupils in secular
values. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the
constitutionality of the American theory of public schooling,
the Court would likely uphold the traditional function as-
signed to public schools. The third section analyzes the
American education tradition using the prisoner's dilemma
game.' These insights are used in the fourth section to argue
for the moral rights of parents to educate and of academic
freedom for public school teachers. Fifth, this moral argu-
ment supports the proposition that the Constitution supports
a parental right to educate and a teacher's right of limited
academic freedom.
This article seeks to establish a right of both parents and
public school teachers to educate subversively. My conception
of a subversive education will become clearer after having
gone through the analysis, but I do want to emphasize I use
the word "subversive" seriously; it is not just a metaphorical
phrase. For example, there is a constitutional right of parents
and teachers to discuss with children the rationality of dis-
obeying the law. Some might object that this proposal makes
the Constitution a suicide pact. Yet other rights are protected
6. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers
to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976).
7. T. VAN GEEL, THE COURTS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION LAW 15-18,
211-213 (1987).
8. See text accompanying notes 149-164 infra.
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despite their arguably subversive effects. For example, free-
dom of speech is protected despite its often unsettling and
disturbing consequences. 9 Moreover, the government has am-
ple constitutional means to protect itself. The Constitution
contains conflicting and constraining rights and powers, and
in part it is this complexity which makes the document so via-
ble. We should recognize these internal contradictions while
seeking to assume that one element of the complex structure
does not overbalance the others.
I. THE AMERICAN EDUCATION TRADITION
Over the centuries a persistent duality of purpose has
characterized American educational policy. Education, espe-
cially public schooling, has been advanced as the best means
for shaping and molding the beliefs, values and character of
youth. At the same time, education has been seen as the
route to develop critical thinking and the capacity for rea-
soned value and moral choices. Occasionally this duality is
manifested in political conflict between contending educa-
tional philosophers, but the duality is often found within the
thinking of individual proponents of public education and
educational theorists. Educational reformer Theodore Sizer
has written:
While there may be a certain, theoretical contradiction
between a state which asserts that it exists at the pleasure of
the governed, who have important rights as autonomous in-
dividuals, and a state which requires that all individuals un-
derstand and believe certain things and act in certain ways,
it is fanciful to argue that the state has no claims on the
minds and actions of its citizens. The real issue is what
claims and how they are to be met.10
To better understand the tension between these two
poles in American education, it is important to capture some
of the richness of argument supporting each part of the dual
vision. Some see education as primarily concerned with shap-
ing values and beliefs, other thinkers have included both in-
culcation and critical thinking in their educational prescrip-
9. See generally F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982).
10. Former Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, for-
mer headmaster of Philips Academy, Professor of Education at Brown Uni-
versity. T. R. SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE: THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN
HIGH SCHOOL 85-86 (1984).
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tions, and others have advocated education as an engine of
liberation.
A. The Tradition of Inculcation
One of the foremost historians of American education
has written:
The original intent in creating a system of universal,
free, compulsory, and secular public schools was thus a po-
litical purpose. It was to enable peoples who came from di-
verse national, religious, and cultural backgrounds to
achieve a sense of community and to acquire the common
values of a democratic polity. It was to do this by promoting
the knowledge, the understanding and the sentiments or at-
titudes necessary for exercising the responsibilities of demo-
cratic citizenship. In order to enable all persons in the pop-
ulation to acquire the requisite knowledge and disposition
essential for the social cohesion of a democratic republic, it
was essential to build a system of schools that would not only
be public in purpose but also public in control, public in
support, and public in access.11
Even before the great wave of immigrants in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, it was argued that education to pro-
mote virtue was essential if the republic was to survive. In the
"seedtime of the republic" most who thought about educa-
tion viewed humanity as "a composite of good and evil, of
ennobling excellencies and degrading imperfections."'"
Given this decidedly mixed human nature, one of the chief
purposes of community was to help people pursue their bet-
ter natures by establishing religions and political institutions
to give virtue free play while controlling vice, and by educat-
ing people to recognize the "sweet harvest of the one and the
better fruits of the other."1 " Education was necessary not
only for personal good, but also for the maintenance of lib-
erty. As Samuel Adams wrote "We may look up to Armies
for our Defense, but Virtue is our best Security. It is not pos-
sible that any State should long remain free, where Virtue is
not supremely honored."' " The need for general devotion to
11. Butts, The Public Purpose of the Public School, 75 TEACHERS COL-
LEGE RECORD 208 (1973). See also, C. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC:
COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860 81-103 (1983).
12. C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 372 (1953).
13. Id.
14. Id., at 429.
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virtue - virtue consisting of a willing sacrifice of self-interest
for the public good and willing obedience to the law - grew
out of the belief that popularly elected rulers could be effec-
tive only if the populace was public-spirited and self-sacrific-
ing.15 Even the Federalist Papers, a work noted for its view of
human nature as the pursuit of narrow self-interest, contains
several essays arguing for virtue as the necessary basis for re-
publican government." Jefferson also argued that education
of the populace was necessary to protect the republican form
of government and the natural rights of individuals." To this
end he suggested, among other things, that the capacity for
moral judgment could be improved by memorizing correct
moral judgments presented by the teacher. 8
The defining characteristics of colonial education were
that it was private, religiously based, and vocationally ori-
ented. 9 Because educating children in the proper religious
beliefs was central to education, teachers enjoyed virtually no
academic freedom to teach according to their own ideas.
During the revolutionary period, strong political pressures,
including loyalty oaths, were used to assure that teachers
loyal to England kept silent."' Teachers expressing loyalty to
England suffered financial disaster or were driven out of the
15. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
65-70 (1969). See also J.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLOR-
ENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975). A growing body of literature has addressed the question of whether
civic republicanism as described by such scholars as Wood and Pocock was
in fact embraced by such figures as Jefferson, whether civic republicanism
took on various forms in different parts of the new nation, and whether the
political philosophy of the new nation might not better be described as a
form of libertarianism. Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and
Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WILLIAM AND MARY Q. 3
(1986); Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WILLIAM AND
MARY Q. 20 (1986); Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican
Tradition Addressed, in J. HIGHAM AND P. CONKIN, EDS., NEW DIRECTIONS IN
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 116 (1979); Kramnick, Republican Revi-
sionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629 (1982); Shalhope, Republicanism and
Early American Historiography, 39 WILLIAM AND MARY Q. 334 (1982);
Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment" Revisited: A Study in History and Ideol-
ogy, 53 J. OF MOD. HIST. 49 (1981). See also Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
16. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST, 186-188, 205-
207 (1981).
17. A. KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 168 (1943).
18. R. D. HESLEP, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EDUCATION 93-95 (1969).
19. H. BEALE, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS 22, 25, 29, 51, 56 (1941).
20. Id. at 59-61.
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country, "as was President Cooper of Columbia, who fled
over the college fence, half-dressed, finally to escape to a
British sloop."21
Moving forward in time to the 1830s and 1840s and the
start of the public school system, we find similar themes in
the justifications offered for a public school system articu-
lated by Horace Mann. Mann, a lawyer turned educator, saw
education as a better means of social control than the law.
Mann argued that a common belief in a political creed must
be fostered if the republic was to be maintained. 2 Intelli-
gence constrained by virtue and a belief in the truths of polit-
ics and morals would make the country free, prosperous,
moral and republican.' Similarly, Henry Barnard, another
national figure in education of the same period, urged the
indoctrination of pupils in capitalism, the cultivation of patri-
otism, and religious and moral instruction . 4 The strong reli-
gious basis of the schools once gain worked to limit the free-
dom of teachers. 5
Toward the end of the century and following the First
World War the effort to inculcate pupils in certain values was
given a name - Americanization. As defined by its advo-
cates, Americanization was the assimilation of millions of im-
migrants to the American way of life to promote loyalty to
the government, to prevent crime, and to prevent the impor-
tation of radical ideologies, such as socialism and commu-
nism . 6 The central features of this program to melt down
ethnic differences were required instruction in English,
health and personal hygiene, creating a shame of being "for-
eign," and promoting patriotism.' 7 So fervent was the con-
cern with Americanizing immigrants that Oregon adopted a
law requiring all pupils to attend public schools. This was to
prevent immigrant students from attending the unAmerican
and possibly subversive private schools that seemed to
abound. As one Klansman noted, "Somehow these mongrel
21. Id. at 60.
22. J. SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL 1642-1985, 82, 84, 87 (1986). See
also, R. WELTER, POPULAR EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT IN
AMERICA 117 (1962); M. CURTI, THE SOCIAL IDEAS OF AMERICAN EDUCATORS
111 (1963).
23. Welter, supra note 22, at 117.
24. Curti, supra note 22, at 142, 155, 161.
25. Beale, supra note 19 at 67-87.
26. Spring supra note 22, at 168.
27. T.B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM 231-255 (1974); J. HIGHAM,
STRANGERS IN THE LAND, ch. IX (1955).
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hordes must be Americanized; failing that, deportation is the
only remedy." 8
The same interest in inculcating youth is currently found
in commentators from both the right and the left. Former
Secretary of Education T.H. Bell has said, "Citizenship edu-
cation cannot and should not be divorced from moral educa-
tion."2 9 Our schools, he continued, were "grounded on a
concern for transferring our basic values to our children, in
short, in educating them in these values.""0 Milton Friedman,
a free market advocate, and Henry Levin, a liberal econo-
mist, both advocate governmental efforts to assure pupils are
properly inculcated."1 James P. Shaver and William Strong,
28. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: Background of the Pierce Case, 74
AM. HIST. REv. 74, 79 (1968). The Supreme Court declared the Oregon law
effectively abolishing public schools to be unconstitutional. Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927).
29. Bell, Values and Morality, in EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP 35 (U.S.
Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare 1976).
30. Id.
31. Friedman writes, "A stable and democratic society is impossible
without a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most
citizens and without widespread acceptance of some common set of values.
Education can contribute to both." M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
86 (1962). Elsewhere Friedman writes, "[Piroviding for the common social
values required for a stable society, on the one hand, and indoctrination
inhibiting freedom of thought and belief, on the other hand is another of
those vague boundaries that is easier to mention than to define." Id. at 90.
Friedman would strike his balance by abolishing public schooling, establish-
ing a system of vouchers to help parents pay for the private schooling they
wish to send their children to, and imposing on those private schools regu-
lations that require them to provide all pupils a minimum amount of school
of a specified kind. Id. at 86, 89. Henry Levin argues, however, that even
regulated private schools cannot provide the kind of enculturation needed
in a democracy. According to Levin,
[e]ffective participation in a democracy requires a willingness to
tolerate diversity. This process must acknowledge the existence of
different views on a subject and accept a set of procedures for
resolving differences among those views in reaching social deci-
sions. This requirement suggests that schooling for democracy
must ensure exposure to different views in controversial areas, a
discourse among those views, and the acceptance of a mechanism
for reconciling the debate. Research on political socialization has
shown that tolerance for diversity is related to the degree to which
different children are exposed to different viewpoints on contro-
versial subjects in both the home and the school.
Levin, Education as Public and Private Good, 6 J. POL'Y ANAL. AND MGM'T
628, 636 (1987) (footnote omitted). Levin continues by noting that it seems
unlikely that private schools with narrow political and religious sponsorship
would promote this exposure to a diversity of ideas.
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professors of education, state that schools and teachers have
an obligation "to encourage emotive commitment to the ba-
sic values of society, as well as growth in the cognitive process
of value identification, value clarification, and value conflict
resolution." 2 A position statement issued by the National
Council for the Social Studies states that it is the ethical re-
sponsibility of social studies professionals to provide every
student with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary to
function as an effective citizen."3 This duty was interpreted to
mean, among other things, that "social studies professionals
have an obligation to provide instruction which instills com-
mitment to democratic values and faith in the dignity and
worth of the individual."' 4 Other principles stress the ethical
responsibility of the professional to foster a critical assess-
ment of principles and values as well as the free contest of
ideas. An obvious and unresolved tension has been built into
the code.
The sentiments supporting inculcation may be found in
legislation. 5 Most states today require such things as the
study of United States history and the Constitution and patri-
otic exercises including the display of flags, a daily flag salute,
and the singing of the national anthem. National holidays
must be observed, and some states require readings from the
biographies of American statesmen and patriots on these oc-
casions. "Americanism" is a required part of the curriculum
of some states as is instruction to teach students the duty to
defend the country against infiltration. It is also not uncom-
mon for statutes to require the fostering of an appreciation
of the U.S. government, its ideals, and the duties of
citizenship.
Additional requirements impose on students a duty to
study the "benefits of the free enterprise system" and the
"evils," "fallacies," and "false doctrines" of Communism. 6
In conjunction with these requirements states have imposed
32. J. SHAVER AND W. STRONG, FACING VALUE DECISIONS: RATIONAL-
BUILDING FOR TEACHERS 107 (1976).
33, National Council for the Social Studies, A Code of Ethics for the
Social Studies Profession, 45 SOCIAL EDUCATION 451 (1981).
34. Id.
35. Edleman, Basic American 6 NOLPE SCH. LJ. 83 (1976); Shelton,
Legislative Control over Public School Curriculum, 15 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 473
(1979).
36. ALA. CODE § 16-40-3 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-711




restrictions on what may be taught in the public schools.
Some states prohibit the use of "subversive" materials, the
advocacy of Communism, or the teaching of materials which
undermine patriotism."' Alabama requires its pupils to learn
the "principles of patriotism."" The sheer quantity of re-
quired political education in the United States is impressive,
perhaps even greater than what is required in the Soviet
Union."
The strong pressures to have patriotic virtues taught
have been translated into pressures on teachers to be patri-
otic citizens. These pressures have taken the form of loyalty
oaths, pressure to teach the "correct" version of sensitive his-
torical events, and dismissals for not participating in a flag
salute ceremony, for teaching the value of "peace," for hold-
ing radical political or economic beliefs, for discussing Russia
in the classroom, for supporting the fledgling labor move-
ment in the country, and for teaching about evolution." Po-
litical pressures to ban books have also been common."1
B. Inculcation Which Accommodates Critical Thinking
The tradition of inculcation has been subject to criticism,
and professional educators would be loath to argue that in-
culcation is the only good of education. The quotation from
Professor Sizer reflects the ambivalence shared by many phi-
losophers of education."' The nature of this ambivalence is
explored further, as are suggestions to overcome the seeming
contradiction between inculcation and instruction in critical
thinking.
In a report on American public schools John Goodlad"
offers approximately six pages of goals for schooling,
37. N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 704 (McKinney 1969).
38. ALA. CODE § 16-40-6 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
39. Bereday and Stretch, Political Education in the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.,
7 COMPARATIVE EDUC. REV. 9 (1963).
40. See generally H. BEALE, ARE AMERICAN TEACHER'S FREE? (1936).
41. Id. at 261ff; S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMER-
ICAN SCHOOLING (1983).
42. See T. SIZER, supra note 10. See also A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC ED-
UCATION (1987); J. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND MIND (1977); J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); van Geel, John Rawls and Education Policy, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SCHOOL POLITICS 121 (S. Grove and F. Wirt eds.
1976); Pincoffs, On Avoiding Moral Indoctrination, in EDUCATIONAL JUDG-
MENTS: PAPERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 59 (J. Doyle, ed. 1973); J.
CHILDS, EDUCATION AND MORALS (1950).
43. J.I. GOODLAD, A PLACE CALLED SCHOOL: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
(1984).
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including:
2.2 Develop the ability to use and evaluate knowledge,
i.e., critical and independent thinking that enables
one to make judgments and decisions in a wide vari-
ety of life roles - citizen, consumer, worker, etc.
as well as intellectual activities ....
4.1 Develop a knowledge of opposing value systems and
their influence on the individual and society ....
5.4 Develop a commitment to the values of liberty, gov-
ernment by consent of the governed, representa-
tional government, and one's responsibility for the
welfare of all ....
5.6 Exercise the democratic right to dissent in accor-
dance with personal conscience.
6.4 Understand and adopt the norms, values, and tradi-
tions of the groups of which one is a member ....
7.2 Develop a commitment to truth and values ....
7.4 Develop moral integrity ....
9.2 Develop the ability to be tolerant of new ideas ....
10.3 Develop the ability to be flexible and to consider dif-
ferent points of view."'
Unfortunately Goodlad fails to discuss the potential conflict
between these goals, such as encouraging students to be inde-
pendent thinkers while developing in them a commitment to
certain basic values. Nevertheless Goodlad's list represents
the duality in goals of many educational thinkers. Two other
educators, however, have developed a curriculum which ac-
counts for both educational goals.
Donald Oliver and James Shaver base their proposal for
teaching social studies on two premises: (a) all societies and
especially the American society should promote the dignity
and worth of each individual; and (b) human fulfillment de-
pends upon "the interdependence of [people] and groups
within a societal setting."' 5 Because they accept premise (a),
Oliver and Shaver state that they must be concerned with the
perpetuation of that value." Freedom of choice among alter-
native ways of life is seen as necessary for the perpetuation of
the value of dignity.' 7 It follows, in their view, that there
44. Id. at 51-54.
45. D.W. OLIVER AND J.P. SHAVER, TEACHING PUBLIC ISSUES IN THE
HIGH SCHOOL 9, 11 (1966, 1974).




must be "a multiplicity of groups - subsocieties - to sup-
port alternative solutions to the problems men must face in
their dealings with the world . . . . A plurality of active
groups - i.e., pluralism - is a necessary ingredient of a free
society, because it is the only natural mechanism which can
insure some freedom of choice." 8 By accepting premise (b)
Oliver and Shaver argue that cohesion of these groups within
a societal setting must also be pursued by recogning three
points:
(1) Despite an inevitable degree of isolation among
groups within the society, there must be recognition that
many problems have to handled by the community as a
whole. (2) The members of all the subgroups must to some
extent share value commitments and a normative vocabu-
lary as a framework within which to deal with these com-
mon problems. And (3) this normative framework must in-
clude procedures for the mediation of interpersonal and
intergroup conflict, especially as necessary to solve the soci-
etal problems.' 9
They conclude that a governmental policy devoted to both
human dignity and a national society must protect the auton-
omy of individual groups and develop a common standard
which can be applied to conflict within the nation.50
The American solution to protect dignity, to develop
common standards to resolve disputes, and to mediate inter-
group conflict is the American Creed.51 The Creed, accord-
ing to Oliver and Shaver, embodies a number of principles
such as the rule of law, a right to welfare, and protection of
48. Id.
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 12. Oliver and Shaver apparently view the American Creed
as something different from Christianity and Communism, both of which
they call an ideology, and which they reject as a basis upon which to build
the curriculum in the public schools. Id. at 12-13. These ideologies define
truth in too unequivocal terms and the principle of human dignity and
freedom of choice "assumes there is usually more than one legitimate alter-
native from which to choose in matters of public decision." Id. at 13. Oli-
ver and Shaver underscore their position by taking a skeptical stand toward
moral truth saying "there is no revealed truth." Id. Yet if they accept this
position then the American Creed must also be subjected to the same cor-
rosive acid bath, something they do not do. Instead they take the position
that the American Creed is in fact accepted by our society and that it is a
"useful political and social framework." Id. at 11-12, 13.
19881
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individual rights of religion and free speech.52 Given this
Creed the American government is in a difficult position: it is
obligated to protect rights of individuals and groups although
this protection fosters social and political conflict. The para-
dox facing the American government is one of fostering dis-
pute while at the same time being required to resolve it."
Central to the solution of this paradox is the public
school. To help assure the formation of a national society and
the resolution of conflicts that will emerge in a pluralistic so-
ciety, the schools should ensure that students are "committed
to basic ideals of American society emerging from the demo-
cratic traditions of Western civilization."" This commitment
helps assure societal cohesion while at the same time avoiding
indoctrination and "unthinking obedience."55 Indoctrination
52. They also note the Creed includes the following principles: con-
sent and representation; a guarantee of the equal protection of the laws;
private property; a prohibition against arbitrary action thus a right to
proper prior notice of impending governmental action, restrictions used on
the obtaining of evidence and confessions, hearings prior to governmental
action and restrictions on governmental invasion of personal rights; a faith
in reason as a method of dealing with conflict; the principle of separation
of powers and checks and balances; the principle of federalism; adherence
to a principle that government is to see that some people are not down-
trodden and/or exploited; and insurance of domestic tranquility and provi-
sion for a common defense Id. at 12, 15, 70-81.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 14.
55. Id. Oliver and Shaver have not defined their use of the word "in-
doctrination," a word about which many have argued as to its meaning.
These disputes have largely turned on whether the word should be defined
in terms of the intention of the teacher, the content of what is being
taught, or the method of teaching, or perhaps some combination of these
elements. The arguments usually proceed by one philosopher pointing out
how the definition of another philosopher seems to label some activity as
"indoctrination" when in ordinary usage we would not so label the activity.
For example, under a definition of indoctrination which emphasizes teach-
ing methods which do not rely on critical thinking and the use of reason, a
teacher who makes his class memorize the multiplication tables is indoctri-
nating. The critics of this position argue that we do not normally label the
memorization of such material indoctrination and, if it is indoctrination,
then the normally bad connotation associated with the word needs to be
dispelled. Thus, it is argued, it would be preferable to emphasize in the
definition of the term the nature of the materials to be learned, i.e., you
can only have indoctrination if the materials involved constitute "doc-
trines," and there is no publicly accepted evidence for proving these doc-
trines. Of course a definition which stresses only this feature of the learn-
ing situation leads to the labeling of much of what goes on in schools as
indoctrination regardless of whether rote memorization is involved. Any
teaching about political and moral beliefs could thus become indoctrina-
[Vol. 3
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is avoided because students are only expected to hold "gen-
eral values." Students would not be expected to translate
"these values into specific policy decisions about which there
must be disagreement." '' Oliver and Shaver recognize the
translation of these general and sometimes conflicting values
into specific solutions is a real problem.5 7 They call the proce-
dure our society has adopted for resolving disputes "rational
consent."'8 "The word rational emphasizes commitment to
reason and thoughtful reflection. Consent emphasizes the
principle that each person involved in the dispute should
have a chance to express his opinion before being bound by a
decision affecting him."5 Their proposal is to teach students
some of the skills needed for the rational consent process.
Teaching these skills also promotes freedom of choice.
Thus Oliver and Shaver propose that students be ex-
posed to public problems involving complex factual issues
and value conflicts, in which different people have taken dif-
ferent positions." Students would be asked to think about
these problems in a way familiar to anyone who has attended
law school. In fact, Oliver and Shaver call their approach "ju-
risprudential teaching," and expect the teacher to play a "so-
cratic role" in helping the students to identify and differenti-
ate definitional, factual and value issues; to deal with these
issues; to learn the use of logic and analogy; and generally to
tion. Yet other philosophers would stress the purpose of the teacher. Thus
a teacher indoctrinates if his or her purpose is to get the student to believe
that a proposition is true and that nothing will shake that belief. And yet
others would stress the method being used, e.g., non-rational methods. Of
course, if this definition is not qualified, all instruction that relies on non-
rational methods because of the immaturity of the child becomes indoctri-
nation. Smart, The Concept of Indoctrination, in NEw ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF EDUCATION 171 (G. Langford and D. O'Connor, eds. 1965); Wilson,
Education and Indoctrination, and Hare, Adolescents into Adults, both in AIMs
IN EDUCATION: THE PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH 24, 47 (T. Hollins, ed. 1964);
Flew, What is Indoctrination?, 4 STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 281
(1966); Moore, Indoctrination as a Normative Conception, 4 STUDIES IN PHI-
LOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 396 (1966); Wilson, Comment on Flew's "What is
Indoctrination?": Comments on Moore and Wilson 5 STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
AND EDUCATION 273 (1967); Snook, The Concept of Indoctrination, 7 STUDIES
IN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 65 (1970); Rosemont, On the Concept of In-
doctrination, 7 STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 226 (1967); White,
Indoctrination, in THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION 177 (R. Peters, ed. 1967).
56. D. OLIVER AND J. SHAVER, supra note 45, at 14.
57. Id. at 24, 25, 59.
58. Id. at 60.
59. Id. at 61 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 88-89; see generally ch. VI, 88-113.
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learn to clarify disputes and perhaps even resolve them.61 In
sum, the student is to learn "the legal, ethical, and factual
substance of the issues under discussion, the way this infor-
mation relates to his own personal knowledge and values, and
sensitivity to the general processes by which the issues might
be clarified." '62
To conclude, it would be useful to list the basic princi-
ples of those who seek to combine inculcation with instruc-
tion in critical thinking. First, it is assumed that certain basic
moral and political principles are true, at least for this soci-
ety.6" A corollary is that these principles are good, and thus
truth and goodness coincide. Second, it is assumed that these
principles are discoverable and known. Third, it is important
for a variety of different reasons - cohesion, formation of
community, the avoidance of violence, the maintenance of a
democratic form of government - that these basic moral
and political principles are accepted by a significant portion
of the population. A corollary of the third proposition is that
a good person leads to a good society and to a good state.
Fourth, legitimate educational methods can teach children to
believe in these principles. Fifth, people are malleable and an
expressed belief in these principles does change their behav-
ior in beneficial ways for all concerned. The corollaries of
this principle are that ideas do shape people's behavior; that
ideas, values and principles are not merely epiphenomena -
a superstructure erected to rationalize and legitimize under-
lying economic and political power structures; and that peo-
ple and individual behavior do make a historical difference;
that is, we are not in the iron grip of historical forces that are
pushing us toward a destiny we cannot resist. Sixth, those
same discoverable principles limit the methods and extent to
which the state may seek to inculcate the youth. However,
those same limitations do not so limit the inculcation enter-
prise as to block it. Seventh, it is assumed that respecting in-
dividual autonomy of belief formation as required by princi-
ple six, and even instructing in the skills of critical analysis
and thinking will not turn-back upon and undermine the
whole enterprise of obtaining the children's acceptance of
the basic principles noted in the first principle.
61. Id. at 115; see generally ch. VI, 88-113.
62. Id. at 116 (emphasis in original); cf. Ennis, Critical Thinking, 32
HARv. EDuC. REV. 81 (1962); Metcalf, Research on Teaching the Social Studies,
in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING 934 (N. Gage ed. 1963).
63. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
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C. Rejection of Inculcation
Accommodationist proposals, such as those of Oliver and
Shaver, are not the only form of opposition to a pure pro-
gram of inculcation. Some groups and advocates have placed
greater emphasis upon the need for education to assure con-
tinued respect for private property and capitalism, others
have worked for an educational program that would produce
good workers. Others advocated educational programs aimed
toward improving equality of opportunity and helping work-
ers protect themselves from economic and political exploita-
tion." While the social thought of American educators has
been rich in many themes, I want to emphasize one particular
melody - the concern with educating for critical thought.
John Dewey sought to move education away from the
rote learning of prescriptions toward a more active enterprise
in which students worked together to solve problems." The
school was to avoid teaching abstract ideas, but was to pro-
vide a laboratory in which students could test their own
moral and social judgments, and adopt and adapt those ideas
and values that worked best in particular social circum-
stances. Students were no longer expected to conform their
thought and behavior to an external source, whether it be
the Bible or a conception of social justice and democracy.
Dewey, relying on a biological model, believed that if chil-
dren were merely fitted to live in a particular environment,
they would not be prepared to survive in a changing and pro-
gressive social environment.0 6
A.S. Neill in England and John Holt in the United States
advocated an even more radical program of instruction which
can best be described as child-controlled and child-driven. "
Based on the assumption that children are naturally curious,
they argue adults need only provide a rich environment for
children, whether it be to play or to undertake intellectually
demanding projects of study and creation. Students are even
free to decide if and when they learn to read, to do mathe-
matics, and to learn about science, history, and literature.
64. See generally Curti, supra note 22; Welter, supra note 22; Spring,
supra note 22.
65. Spring, supra note 22, at 172-73.
66. Curti, supra note 22, at 516-17. For a review of the effect of
Dewey's ideas on American education, see L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE SCHOOL (1961).
67. A.S. NEILL, SUMMERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CHILD REARING
(1960); J. HOLT, FREEDOM AND BEYOND (1972).
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Neill and Holt accept the possibility that a given child will
never, or perhaps only in adulthood, have the motivation and
desire to learn to read. They believe that the natural human
drive to learn, combined with the example of seeing others,
will quickly and almost inevitably lead children to seek assis-
tance to engage themselves in the whole range of subjects
which comprise the school curriculum.
Professor Israel Scheffler begins his prescription for edu-
cation by asking, "What should be the purpose and content
of an educational system in a democratic society, in so far as
it relates to moral concerns?" 68 He answers this by positing a
central principle of democratic society: "It aims to structure
the arrangements of society so as to rest them upon the con-
sent of its members."6 This aim requires reasoned proce-
dures for the critical review of policy by all members of soci-
ety. The society sustains itself not by indoctrination, "but by
the reasoned choices of its citizens." 0 The democratic faith
consists in a reasonable trust that unfettered inquiry and free
choice will be valued by a free and informed people."
Since all people are expected to participate in the forma-
tion of policy, education becomes a condition of the survival
of such a society. The function of education must be to "lib-
erate the mind, strengthen its critical powers, inform it with
knowledge and the capacity for independent inquiry, engage
its human sympathies, and illuminate its moral and practical
choices." 2 As if his point was not clear, Scheffler states that
"[T]o choose the democratic ideal for society is wholly to re-
ject the conception of education as an instrument of rule; it is
to surrender the idea of shaping or molding the mind of the
pupil."78 The purpose of education should be to cultivate
'reasonableness," and
[t]o cultivate this trait is to liberate the mind from dogmatic
adherence to prevalent ideological fashions, as well as from
the dictates of authority. For the rational mind is en-
couraged to go beyond such fashions and dictates and to
ask for their justifications, whether the issue be factual or
68. I. Scheffler, Moral Education and the Democratic Ideal, in REAsON
AND TEACHING 136 (1973).
69. Id. at 137.
70. Id.
71. Id.





That Scheffler fully understands the implications of his
argument is clear from the following:
Such a direction in schooling is fraught with risk, for it
means entrusting our current conceptions to the judgment
of our pupils. In exposing these conceptions to their ra-
tional evaluation we are inviting them to see for themselves
whether our conceptions are adequate, proper, fair. Such a
risk is central to scientific education, where we deliberately
subject our current theories to the test of continuous evalu-
ation by future generations of our student-scientists. It is
central also to our moral code, in so far as we ourselves take
the moral point of view toward this code. And, finally, it is
central to the democratic commitment which holds social
policies to be continually open to free and public review. In
sum, rationality liberates, but. there is no liberty without
risk. 5
The heart of American political tradition shares at least
this much with Plato - a belief in the importance and value
of education for building the good society and overcoming
conflict and division. 6 But, whereas Plato's ideal state was to
be ruled by an elite educated according to certain principles,
the American state is to be ruled by "the people" who also
must be properly educated. This vision of society, govern-
ment, and politics departs drastically from those other visions
which assume peace and prosperity must basically be either a
function of power or a function of a properly constructed
machinery of government that would, despite human nature,
run itself.7 7 This tradition values inculcation but sometimes
74. Id. at 142-43.
75. Id. at 143. See also, van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on
Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REV. 197 (1983). The
suggestion is made there that a school's educational program ought to be
designed to assure that students will be able to arrive at their own beliefs
autonomously. This goal could be advanced if the school's curriculum had
to adhere to a principle of fairness:
(1) When a school provides instruction on matters of a political or
moral nature, it must adequately and objectively cover the issues
explicitly and implicitly touched upon by the materials; (2) The
coverage must be fair in that it accurately and objectively reflects
the opposing view on the issues; and (3) The instruction must
devote reasonable attention to the major opposing views.
Id. at 290 (footnotes elaborating key terms in the principle are omitted).
76. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book IV, iii.
77. T. HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 80-84 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946); see M.
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attempts to accommodate the radical critics by structuring a
program of both inculcation and training in critical thinking.
The accommodation is only partially complete because the
concept of critical thinking accepted by many educators and
philosophers is but a weak version of the kind of radical anal-
ysis that, for example, Scheffler calls for. Thus, despite the
tensions and conflicts within American education thought, it
is a tradition that seeks social control and social ends through
inculcation of the young.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AUTHORITY TO INCULCATE
The same tensions observed in the American education
tradition regarding the proper role of public schools in pro-
viding civic education are replicated in the opinions of the
Supreme Court. A plausible reading of this body of prece-
dent suggests three points. First, the Court appears to be
predisposed to permit states to forge a curriculum designed
to inculcate those values the state considers to be fundamen-
tal for the maintenance of democracy. Second, the language
of the opinions also reflects a continuing judicial ambivalence
toward the basic authority of the state to inculcate. Third,
the Court has established safeguards to check or constrain
the exercise of the state's power.
A. Disposition to Permit Inculcation
It should be understood that there has been no direct
challenge of the state's authority to provide a program of sec-
ular inculcation in the classrooms of public schools. The cases
that have touched on the question of inculcation have done
so only tangentially, for example, Board of Education v. Pico, 8
in which the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a school's
decision to remove books from the school library. (The case
will be discussed at greater length below.) Nevertheless, the
Court seems likely to hold that a deliberate program of incul-
cation would be found constitutional.
The history of these constitutional complexities begins
with the ruling in Meyer v. Nebraska79 which struck down a
state law severely limiting the language curriculum of private
schools. The Court wrote:
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 17-19 (1986).
78. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
79. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato sug-
gested a law which should provide: "That the wives of our
guardians are to be common, and their children are to be
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any
child his parent . . . .The proper officers will take the off-
spring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there
they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the
better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away
in some mysterious, known place, as they should be." In or-
der to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and in-
trusted their subsequent education and training to official
guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately
approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the
relation between individual and State were wholly different
from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly
will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such re-
strictions upon the people of a State without doing violence
to both the letter and spirit of the Constitution."0
But while the Court was guarding against the formation of a
Platonic Republic, the Court also stated its ruling was not
meant to preclude a state from making reasonable regula-
tions for all schools.81 "Nor has challenge been made of the
State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which
it supports." 2 The Court seemed to support an educational
system in which students and their parents would be able to
choose between a private school, judicially protected against
unreasonable regulations, and a public school with a state-
controlled program of inculcation. While the private school
80. 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923). The statute struck down in this case
under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause made it a misde-
meanor to teach a subject in any language other than English in any pri-
vate or public school or to teach any language other than English to stu-
dents who had successfully passed the eighth grade. Id. at 397. The
Nebraska Supreme Court had upheld the statute on the ground that to
educate the children of foreigners in their mother tongue was "to educate
them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a conse-
quence, naturally inculcate them in the ideas and sentiments foreign to the
best interests on the country." Id. at 397-98. The Supreme Court in strik-
ing the law down stated that it appreciated the state's "desire ... to foster
a homogeneous people with American ideals" but that the means adopted
exceeded the state's power and conflicted with the rights of the teacher,
the parents and students affected by the law. Id. at 401-402.
81. Id. at 402.
82. Id.
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curriculum could only be subject to "reasonable regulations,"
the public school's curriculum could be regulated as the state
chose.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters 88 the Court indicated it might
not accept such a model. Two private schools challenged an
Oregon statute compelling all students to attend only the
public schools. In upholding the claim that the statute vio-
lated the rights of parents to control the upbringing of their
children as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court wrote:
[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act .... unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to di-
rect the upbringing and education of children under their
control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed
by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose ex-
cludes any general power of the State to standardize its chil-
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public
school teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."
The Court, consistent with its opinion in Meyer, explicitly
protected the right of parents to send their children to pri-
vate schools. But the Court also made clear in Pierce that pri-
vate schools could be regulated to assure that "certain studies
plainly essential to good citizenship" be taught and nothing
"be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public wel-
fare." 8  The ambivalence of the Court was obvious - it spe-
cifically struck down standardization, while allowing for con-
tinued state authority to require that education "essential to
good citizenship" be provided in the private schools.
The central question to emerge from Pierce was whether
the state's authority to regulate private education was so ex-
tensive as to permit the state to require the private school to
offer a program of instruction identical to that offered in the
public schools - a curriculum which could be wholly indoc-
trinating. One year later the Court answered this question
83. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
84. Id. at 534-35.
85. Id. at 534.
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negatively.86 With the Court's attitude toward state regula-
tion of private schools somewhat clearer, the central question
became how far the state could go in its own schools to incul-
cate pupils.
In the first of two decisions, in 1940 the Supreme Court
rejected the claim by a group of students that a requirement
to join in a flag salute ceremony violated their right to the
free exercise of religion. 7 Following this decision "the West
Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools
therein to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics,
and in the Constitutions of the United States and of the State
'for the purpose of teaching, fostering and perpetuating the
ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing
the knowledge of the organization and machinery of govern-
ment.' "8 The State Board of Education adopted a resolution
in 1942 containing quotations from the Court's 1940 deci-
sion and ordered the flag salute to become a mandatory part
of the school program. Failure to participate in the ceremony
was deemed to be insubordination and punished by expul-
sion. Further, an expelled child was "unlawfully absent" and
could be prosecuted as a delinquent. The parents or guardian
were also liable to prosecution."
A group of Jehovah's Witnesses brought suit seeking to
restrain enforcement of the compelled participation in the
flag salute on the grounds that their religious beliefs forbade
them from saluting the flag since it was a "graven image."
The Supreme Court reversed course and concluded that
compelled participation in a flag ceremony violated the stu-
dents' rights of freedom of speech under the first amendment.
The precise holding and rule of this case is difficult to deter-
mine.9" The decision might be read as dealing only with the
method by which fostering of patriotic sentiments is accom-
86. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). In this case the
Court struck down under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause
a regulatory scheme that prohibited students from: (1) attending private
schools until after they had completed the second grade in the public
schools, and (2) attending them for more than one hour each day, after the
public schools had closed, and then for not more than six hours each week.
To further guarantee that these schools, largely attended by Japanese chil-
dren, could not foster disloyalty, complete control of the curriculum was
given over to the state's department of education.
87. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
88. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625
(1943).
89. Id. at 629.
90. T. VAN GEEL, supra note 7, at 189.
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plished.91 That is, attempting to foster patriotism by exposing
a person to criminal penalties for failure to participate in a
flag salute ceremony violates the first amendment right not to
be forced publicly to express sentiments with which they disa-
gree. This interpretation is underscored by the Court:
[T]he State may "require teaching by instruction and study
of all in our history and in the structure and organization of
our government, including the guarantees of civil liberty,
which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country."
Here, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of stu-
dents to declare a belief. They are not merely made ac-
quainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed
as to what it is or even what it means. The issue here is
whether this slow and easily neglected route to arousing
loyalties may constitutionally be short-cut by substituting a
compulsory salute or slogan.9"
A cautious approach to the interpretation of precedent would
favor a narrow interpretation, but as shall be demonstrated
later other language in the opinion suggests a more sweeping
rule.93
In subsequent cases the Court forcefully announced its
belief that the public schools may seek to inculcate youth in
fundamental values, while at the same time limiting the effec-
tive use of the state's power. In Board of Education v. Pico,"
some students challenged the school board's removal of ten
books from a high school library. The board failed to follow
its own established procedures for handling books challenged
as objectionable95 and proceeded with the removal of the
91. Id.
92. 319 U.S. at 631 (footnotes and citation omitted) (quoting Miners-
ville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 117-20. Perhaps the decision
stands for the broader proposition that the government cannot compel one
to use any time, energy, or property to support the expression of ideas with
which one disagrees. Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Or perhaps Barnette supports
the proposition that the constitution protects a right to personhood and
that a compelled flag salute represents an invasion of the sphere of the
intellect. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIUrIONAL LAW § 15-2, at 1304, § 15-5,
at 1315 (2d ed. 1988). In other words, the decision might stand for the
proposition that the public schools may not seek to inculcate their pupils.
94. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Justice Brennan announced the judgment
of the Court in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens and
joined in part by Justice Blackmun.
95. Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 408-10, 416-17 (2d Cir.
1980), affd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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books which a study committee, staffed by parents and school
personnel, had recommended be retained." The board gave
no reason for rejecting the study committee's recommenda-
tions. But, in the course of the dispute, it issued several news
releases in which the books in question were said to be "anti-
American, anti-Christian, anti-Semetic [sic], and just plain
filthy."9 The district court granted summary judgment for
the school board and the Second Circuit reversed.98 A frag-
mented majority of the Supreme Court affirmed on different
grounds and remanded the case for trial9 9 The plurality
opinion signed by three justices embraced a notion of a stu-
dent's right to hear. This right was used as a First Amend-
ment-based limitation on the authority of the school board to
use the school library as an additional instrument of inculca-
tion.1"' Relying on this principle these justices held that the
school boards could not remove books if intending to deny
students access to ideas merely because of disagreement with
the ideas."0 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun em-
96. Id. at 411.
97. Id. at 410. That same news release also stated that the objectiona-
ble books "contain material which is offensive to Christians, Jews, Blacks,
and Americans in general." Id. A later issue of the board's newsletter ex-
pressed similar concerns. Id. In a deposition commenting on one book
which noted that George Washington was a slaveholder, one of the peti-
tioners said, "I believe it is anti-American to present one of the nation's
heroes, the first President, . . . in such a negative and obviously one-sided
life. [Sic] That is one example of what I would consider anti-American."
457 U.S. at 873 n.25. And in the litigation five board members stated
under oath that the books were removed because "they contained obscen-
ities, were irrelevant to our curriculum, were inappropriate and were in
bad taste. They contained foul language, gross sexual allusions and lan-
guage that just wasn't necessary to the story line. . . . [W]e feel we repre-
sented the basic values of the community in our actions .... 638 F.2d at
424.
98. Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 474 F.Supp. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
99. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). The case never did go back to trial since
the board agreed to return the offending books back to the library shelves.
100. Justice Brennan wrote,
[T]he right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipi-
ent's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and
political freedom. . . . Ulust as access to ideas makes it possible
for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and
press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares students for
active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often conten-
tious society in which they will soon be adult members.
Id. at 867-68 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 870-71.
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braced the notion that the school board may not "deny access
to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that
idea for partisan or political reasons."' 2 He would apply this
principle to the classroom as well as the library. Justice White
concurred only in the decision to remand, refusing to en-
dorse either Justice Brennan's or Justice Blackmun's interpre-
tation of the free speech clause.103 The four dissenters, Chief
Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist
each wrote separately, to further underscore the fragmenta-
tion of the Court.10
The Justices' attitudes toward inculcation can be illumi-
nated by closely examining the individual opinions. The plu-
rality opinion written by Justice Brennan openly embraced
the possibility that the free speech clause imposes no restric-
tions on the authority of a school to inculcate in the class-
room.1 0 5 In fact, Justice Brennan wrote, "Petitioners [the
school board] might well defend their claim of absolute dis-
cretion in matters of curriculum by reliance on their duty to
inculcate community values."' " Justice Brennan also seemed
102. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
104. Justices O'Connor and Powell wrote opinions in which no other
Justice joined; the Chief Justice was joined in his opinion by Justices Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor; and Justice Rehnquist was joined in his
opinion by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell.
105. 457 U.S. at 862. Justice Brennan specifically took note of the
fact that the plaintiffs did not seek to impose limits on the authority of the
board to control the curriculum. Id.
106. Id. at 869 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan attempted to
distinguish the library from the classroom by noting that "the special char-
acteristics of the school library make the environment especially appropri-
ate for the recognition of the First Amendment rights of students." Id. at
868 (emphasis in original). He also noted that library books "by their na-
ture are optional rather than required reading." Id. at 862. And he said,
A school library, no less than any other public library, is "a
place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty .. " [We]
observed that " 'students must always remain free to inquire, to
study, and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.'"
The school library is the principal locus of such freedom.
Id. at 868-69 (citations and footnote omitted). Justice Brennan went on to
say that the claim of an unfettered authority to inculcate
overlooks the unique role of the school library. It appears from
the record that use of the Island Trees school libraries is com-
pletely voluntary on the part of students. Their selection of books
from these libraries is entirely a matter of free choice; the libraries
afford them an opportunity at self-education and individual en-
richment that is wholly optional. Petitioners might well defend
their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reli-
[Vol. 3
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
to be willing to consider the possibility that the first amend-
ment did not address the acquisition of books for the library,
only the removal of books from the library.0 7 As to the nar-
row issue of school board discretion to remove books from
the library, Justice Brennan recognized, on the one hand, the
authority of the school board to inculcate by controlling the
content of the school library and, on the other hand, a stu-
dent's first amendment-based right to receive ideas.10 8 In at-
tempting to reconcile these competing principles Justice
Brennan adopted the motivational test noted earlier. He
moved towards the reconciliation of these competing princi-
ples by saying that the discretion to control the content of
the library "may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or
political manner."10 9 If a board intended by its removal of
books to deny access to ideas merely because of disagreement
with the ideas, then the free speech rights of students have
been violated. Justice Brennan also noted that the student-
plaintiffs had implicitly conceded that this motivation test
would not be violated if the board had removed the books
because they were "pervasively vulgar" or if the decision
were "based solely upon the 'educational suitability' of the
books."110 By seeming to endorse the power to remove books
because of "educational suitability," Justice Brennan re-
opened the door to inculcation through control of books
made available in the library. In any event, this carefully cir-
cumscribed opinion leaves the signers ostensibly on the side
of those who accept the public schools as an engine for incul-
cation and socialization. However, in reaching the decision as
to the rules that govern the removal of books from a library,
Justice Brennan embraced a notion of a right that is not eas-
ily contained-the right to receive ideas. Although he tried
to offer a rationale why this right would be limited to the
library, it takes little imagination to see how it could easily be
extended to the classroom itself with the potential effect of
ance upon their duty to inculcate community values. But we think
that petitioners' reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as
here, they attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion be-
yond the compulsory environment of the classroom, into the
school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds
sway.
Id. at 869 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 862.
108. Id. at 864, 866-67.
109. Id. at 870.
110. Id. at 871.
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undermining the principle he accepted-the authority of the
school to inculcate.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence appears to be the most
liberal opinion, but it is profoundly at odds with itself. He
also accepted the proposition that public schools may incul-
cate fundamental values. But he also embraced a principle of
no-discrimination-against-ideas which would extend to the
classroom as well as the library. It is unclear how he would
reconcile these two principles, and the confusion is com-
pounded when he writes,
School officials must be able to choose one book over an-
other, without outside interference, when the first book is
deemed more relevant to the curriculum, or better written,
or when one of a host of other politically neutral reasons is
present. . . . And even absent space or financial limita-
tions, First Amendment principles would allow a school
board to refuse to make a book available to students be-
cause it contains offensive language . . . or because it is psy-
chologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age
group, or even, perhaps, because the ideas it advances are
"manifestly inimical to the public welfare. . . ." And, of
course, school officials may choose one book over another
because they believe that one subject is more important, or
is more deserving of emphasis. 1 '
Finally, the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist also
strongly endorses the principle that public schools should in-
culcate youth in fundamental values. He seems to avoid the
inconsistencies of the Brennan and Blackmun opinions when
he writes that if the school board is to effectively carry out
this function, it must have unfettered discretion to choose the
books made available to students both in the classroom and
the library. As he stated it, when the government acts as edu-
cator, as compared to government as sovereign, its "actions
• . . do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as ac-
tions by the government as sovereign." 1 ' In response to Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion, Justice Rehnquist writes that "[t]he
idea that such students have a right of access, in the school, to
information other than that thought by their educators to be
necessary is contrary to the very nature of an inculcative edu-
cation. Education consists of the selective presentation and
111. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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explanation of ideas." ' But having said this Justice Rehn-
quist also "cheerfully" agrees with Justice Brennan that the
First Amendment would be violated if a Democratic school
board motivated by partisan sentiments ordered the removal
of all books written by Republicans or "if an all-white school
board, motivated by racial animus," removed all books writ-
ten by black authors or books advocating racial equality and
integration."" Justice Rehnquist does not explain the incon-
sistency between his view that the First Amendment has no
bearing on the school board's control of the curriculum and
his willingness to block partisan and racist motivations in the
shaping of that same curriculum.
Despite these complexities, the one message that
emerges with clarity from these many opinions is that a
strong majority, perhaps even all, of the Justices, accept in-
culcation in the classroom. This view is expressed in two
other modern cases. In the first of these the Court used this
principle in reaching the conclusion that states may refuse to
employ as elementary and secondary school teachers legal
aliens who are eligible to apply for citizenship but who refuse
to do so.1 15 The state's interest in seeing to the inculcation of
youth justifies discrimination against people who may not
faithfully carry out the state's educational program. In Plyler
v. Doe, a decision striking down a Texas policy of excluding
illegal alien children from free public schooling, the Court
pointed out that this policy not only had an impact on these
students by hurting their chances of becoming economically
self-sufficient, but it also denied them the opportunity to be
inculcated in traditional values. This denial would have an
impact both upon the children themselves and upon the
fabric of society. " "
B. Judicial Ambivalence
Despite the Court's language in recent opinions support-
ing state authority to inculcate, there is evidence in the opin-
ions of continuing discomfort with a school program of incul-
cation. This is most clearly seen in the following passages
taken from the majority opinion in the flag salute case.
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of
113. Id. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979).
116. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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its creatures- Board of Education not excepted. These
have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretion-
ary functions, but none that may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to dis-
count important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.1 1
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support
of some end thought essential to their time and country
have been waged by many good as well as evil men. Nation-
alism is a relatively recent phenomenon but at other times
and places the ends have been racial, territorial security,
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for sav-
ing souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity
have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to
an ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure to-
ward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter
as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of
our people could proceed from any provocation than from
finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose pro-
gram public educational officials shall compel youth to unite
in embracing.'
[We apply the limitations of the Constitution with no
fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse
or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic cere-
monies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compul-
sory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the ap-
peal of our institutions to free minds." 9
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
117. West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943).
118. Id. at 640-41.
119. Id. at 641.
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permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compel-
ling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional lim-
itations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.
120
In addition to these earlier passages, more recent opin-
ions sing the praises of freedom of conscience.
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of a broader con-
cept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's
freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his
right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the
majority. At one time it was thought this right merely pro-
scribed the preference of one Christian sect over another,
but would not require equal respect for the conscience of
the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian
faith such as Mohammedanism or Judaism. But when the
underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of
litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the
individual freedom of conscience protected by the First
Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith
or none at all. This conclusion derives support not only
from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of
conscience, but also from conviction that religious beliefs
worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful, and from recognition of the fact that
the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends be-
yond intolerance among Christian sects - or even intoler-
ance among "religions" - to encompass intolerance of the
disbeliever and the uncertain.1"'
Passages in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District also suggest that the Court is willing directly to
limit the authority of the school board to provide a curricu-
lum designed to inculcate.122 The Court wrote, in an opinion
protecting the right of a student to protest the Vietnam War
by wearing a black armband to school, that the school must
remain a marketplace of ideas and that students "may not be
120. Id. at 642 (footnote omitted).
121. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (striking down a
state law calling for a moment of silence in the public schools for medita-
tion or prayer).
122. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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regarded as the closed-circuit recipients of only that which
the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined
to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved."1 ' While suggesting the possibility that the Court
would not approve of a curriculum which is designed to in-
culcate, these passages could also be read as embracing that
very possibility so long as the school protected alternative
ideas through the protection of the free speech rights of stu-
dents. In a second student free speech case the Court seemed
to affirm a narrow view of Tinker.'" The Court once again
espoused the importance of public school for inculcating
pupils in fundamental values and, more specifically, inculcat-
ing pupils in "habits and manners of civility." 2 '
C. Safeguards Limiting State Authority
Besides singing the praises of freedom of conscience the
Court has taken several steps towards limiting the power of
the state to inculcate youth. First, the Court recognized a
123. Id. at 511. The Court concluded in this case that: (i) the free
speech clause did apply to students in public schools; (ii) the wearing of a
black armband in protest to the Vietnam War was akin to pure speech; (iii)
free speech rights of students could be limited if either the school officials
might reasonably forecast that the speech activity would cause material and
substantial disruption and/or interfere with the rights of others, or that in
fact the speech activity did cause material and substantial disruption and/
or did interfere with the rights of others; (iv) and that in this case the wear-
ing of the black armband did not cause material and substantial disruption
nor did it interfere with the rights of others.
124. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164
(1986).
125. Id. In this case the Court upheld the school's punishment of a
pupil who delivered a speech that involved the use of an elaborate sexual
metaphor nominating a fellow student for elective office at a high school
assembly. The Court purported to distinguish Tinker on the grounds that
the speech in Tinker was political speech whereas the speech involved here
had a sexual content. But Fraser's speech was a nominating speech which
would seem to be the essence of a political speech. And while Tinker and
Bethel are factually distinguishable on a number of other grounds - there
was a captive audience in Bethel, the metaphor used did involve sexual in-
nuendo - it is also possible the Court may have in Bethel overruled or
modified Tinker's material and disruption standard. The kind of impact
Fraser's speech had would not seem to amount to material and substantial
disruption, i.e. the speech was greeted with some hooting, yelling and a few
with gestures of simulated sexual activities. This combined with the expres-
sion of a different underlying theory of public education points toward the
possibility the Court is moving today toward a different approach to stu-
dent free speech cases.
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right of parents to send their children to private schools." 6
Second, the Court limited the authority of the state to regu-
late private schools and make them offer a program of in-
struction identical to that in public schools. 2  Third, the
Court has recognized a right of public school students to
freedom of speech, assuring that the "school's voice" is not
the only voice broadcasting to students. 28 Finally, four Jus-
tices have expressed a willingness to shield the school library
with the First Amendment so that it cannot be used by the
school board as one more tool in its program of inculca-
tion. 2" The Court has not recognized, however, a right of
public school teachers to academic freedom in the classroom
- a step that would arguably be the most effective in check-
ing an overreaching inculcation effort by the state.
It seems fair to say that the same tensions detected in the
American education tradition are found in Supreme Court
opinions. The Court has supported state authority to incul-
cate while at the same time praising freedom of conscience,
pointing out the dangers of state efforts to control opinion,
and erecting safeguards to limit the effectiveness of state ef-
forts to inculcate. The ambiguities of this record point to the
need to press the analysis further by asking hypothetically
how the Court might rule on a direct challenge to a state ef-
fort of inculcation.
D. Would the Court Prohibit Governmental Efforts to
Inculcate?
The precedents reviewed above provide one important
basis for predicting how the Court would rule on a constitu-
tional challenge seeking either to bar a public school curricu-
lum designed to inculcate or to impose limits on such an ex-
ercise of state authority. To make such a prediction more
126. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
127. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). In another case
the Court wrote that "parents have a First Amendment right to send their
children to educational institutions that promote the belief that racial seg-
regation is desirable, and that the children have an equal right to attend
such institutions." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (uphold-
ing the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to prohibit private schools from denying
admission to qualified children solely on the basis of race).
128. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
393 U.S. 503 (1969). See also, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106
S.Ct. 3159 (1986).
129. Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School District
No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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secure it is necessary to discuss other materials that would be
taken into account: The Constitutional text, the intent of the
framers, the Constitutional structure, Constitutional theory,
tradition, values and social philosophy, and judicial
competence. 180
To carry out this hypothetical examination three as-
sumptions are needed. First, it is assumed that a state and/or
school board sought to inculcate its pupils in such values as
patriotism, loyalty, virtue, toleration, the democratic form of
government, obedience to law, and respect among the races.
To promote these values the curriculum materials were care-
fully selected and edited. For example, inconvenient facts,
such as that George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were
slave holders, are either omitted or relegated to footnotes.
Social problems were downplayed except that the harm of ra-
cism is discussed, and much evidence is presented to show
that the United States has made great advances in overcom-
ing the problem. Traditional American heroes received ex-
tensive coverage and the devotion of those who volunteered
for military duty is examined. Glowing assessments of the op-
portunities offered to immigrants were provided; and dissent
and rebellion was addressed only to discuss the necessity for
law and order and the dangers of chaos. Second, it is assumed
this challenge claimed the program of instruction imposed a
"pall of orthodoxy" on the school and chills the exercise of
freedom of speech. 81 Third, it is assumed that four conserva-
tive justices adopt an "interpretist" or "original intent" ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation and are prepared to
rule that there is no constitutional right placing a restraint on
the state to shape its curriculum as it wishes. '82 The crucial
question then becomes whether a "moderate" or "liberal"
justice, taking something other than an interpretist approach,
could be persuaded to vote with the conservatives in defeat-
ing this constitutional challenge.
It seems reasonable to assume that our fifth justice would
begin deliberations by examining the Constitutional text. A
quick review of the text yields a fast answer - it would ap-
pear the state has acted constitutionally. The Tenth Amend-
ment's broad language reserving all powers to the states not
130. Cf, Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
131. See, Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).




delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the
states suggests that states have inherent plenary authority
over the educational system within their borders."' Our Jus-
tice now asks whether an "external" check on the authority
of the state might be found, such as an individual constitu-
tional right. A further search of the text brings our justice to
the first amendment and the free speech clause.'" Education
seems related to freedom of speech, so this clause may check
the state's authority. 3 6 However, the language of the amend-
ment does not address the specific question. Up to this point
there would seem to be no constitutional infirmity in what
the state has done.
It seems doubtful that either party could marshal conclu-
sive evidence as to the intent of the framers. The central dif-
ficulty is the nonexistence at the time of the adoption of the
first, tenth or fourteenth Amendments, of anything similar to
our current system of public education, which is attended by
90% of all students.' s Because the framers did not contem-
plate our problem, it is unclear whether they meant to in-
clude authority to inculcate as part of the state's basic police
power or whether the framers intended to prohibit the exer-
cise of such authority as a violation of an individual right. To
the extent there is any historical evidence, it suggests that the
framers would have included a significant degree of inculca-
tion in an education system. 3 The Constitution was adopted
during a period of strong religious conviction and civic re-
publicanism, and even the Federalist papers expressed the im-
portance of "virtue" for making the proposed constitution
work.'3 But perhaps when stated in a suitably abstract and
general way, the intent of the framers can be understood as
being opposed to a public school system which inculcates." 9
133. U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
134. It is assumed that the first amendment has been made applica-
ble, through the incorporation doctrine, to the states and its subsidiaries.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down an Alabama stat-
ute that authorized a period of silence for meditation or prayer).
135. Laurence Tribe describes an external check on legislative au-
thority as a limit which derives from the constitutional structure as a whole
or from a specific constraint such as those in the Bill of Rights. L. TRIBE,
supra note 93, § 5-1, at 297.
136. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1987 118 chart 193 (107th ed. 1986).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 13-21.
138. G. Wills, supra note 16, at 185-92.
139. The question of at how abstract or general a level the original
intent of the framers and/or the purpose of a constitutional provision is to
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For example, the First Amendment may have been intended
to protect both freedom of expression and freedom of belief
formation since freedom of expression without freedom of
belief formation becomes meaningless.140 As Justice Jackson
wrote, it should be public opinion which controls the govern-
ment and not government which controls public opinion.'
Perhaps additional light could be shed on the question by
examining the structure of the Constitution. Here again the
evidence suggests that the state acted properly. The Constitu-
tion established a federal system of government in which the
branches of the federal government - including the judici-
ary - were to have a limited role in the shaping of educa-
tional policy as compared to the states. 42 If the federal judi-
ciary were to have an important role, it would be to enforce
those individual rights which check the state's authority, such
as the First Amendment.
Having examined the text, original intent, and structure
of the Constitution, our justice now turns to precedent for
guidance. As already suggested, the justice would find much
evidence that earlier decisions generally accepted the state's
authority to offer a program of inculcation in public
schools.1 43 Based on precedents, our justice might favor re-
jecting the challenge and upholding the state's authority.
Our justice might also consult materials that some, espe-
cially interpretists, might not consider to be "legal." The first
of these is tradition. Our justice will not find a definitive an-
swer, since the American education tradition is conflicted
concerning state authority to inculcate. 4 Nevertheless, the
justice may reasonably conclude that tradition would suggest
that authority to inculcate should be upheld.
Finally, the justice might turn to contemporary political
and social philosophy. Assuming these materials may prop-
erly be used in reaching a constitutional decision - a point
be phrased is at the heart of modern-day jurisprudential disputes. See R.
DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (1986); M.J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Berger, New Theories of "Interpreta-
tion": The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO STATE L.J. 1 (1986).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 224-230 and 268 for a discus-
sion of additional purposes that might be said to be served by the First
Amendment - purposes suggested by modern-day commentators.
141. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
641 (1943).
142. See VAN GEEL supra note 90 at 70-79; San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 79-125.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 53-77.
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subject to considerable modern debate ' 5 _ the justice will
find such a range of viewpoints as to throw into doubt what is
the best view of the matter."' Given the diversity of opinion
and the deep conflicts in these materials it would not be sur-
prising for our justice to eschew reliance on these materials.
In sum, having considered text, original intent, the struc-
ture of the Constitution, precedent, tradition, and political
and social philosophy, it seems likely that a moderate or lib-
eral justice would vote with the interpretists in upholding the
state's basic authority to inculcate. Perhaps the Court would
step in only if the state attempted to inculcate with racist or
purely partisan motivations, or used methods of instruction
such as brainwashing or psychological conditioning, or used
forced participation in political ceremonies or actively sought
to prevent students from expressing in school ideas contrary
to those in the official curriculum.",7 Stated differently, it
seems safe to say that the Supreme Court would accept the
proposition that state authority in the classroom is plenary,
that states have virtually unfettered authority to prescribe a
curriculum which is purposefully designed to inculcate.
This concluding observation is only a prediction and not
a statement of approval or approbation. Indeed, the Constitu-
tion ought to be interpreted as providing strong protection
for a student's right to freedom of belief and belief forma-
tion.1"' If such an argument were presented to the Court to-
day, however, it would not succeed. But the Court will also
continue to protect the right of parents to send their children
to private schools and a limited right of free speech for
students.
III. A NEW VIEW OF THE AMERICAN EDUCATION TRADITION
The American tradition of inculcation, and the various
145. DWORKIN supra note 139; D.A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1986); PERRY supra note 139.
146. See supra note 42. See also, Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation*
of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 309 (1980); Comment, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum
Material: Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485
(1979); Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voice in the
Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV. 497
(1983); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATES (1980); Note,
State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justify-
ing a Prohibition of School Library Censorship 35 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1983).
147. TRIBE, supra note 93 at 812.
148. VAN GEEL supra note 90.
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ways it has been compromised or resisted, is examined from a
new perspective taken from game theory and economics. A
game called the prisoner's dilemma will be described and
used to re-examine our education tradition. Based on this re-
examination a moral argument is made for the right of par-
ents to educate their children privately and for public school
teachers to enjoy a right of academic freedom.
A. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods
Sometimes efforts to achieve individual interests actually
preclude their achievement. Cooperation is needed to
achieve these individual interests, but achieving cooperation
is often difficult if not impossible. Robert Axelrod asks:
Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a
world of egoists without central authority? This question
has intrigued people for a long time. And for good reason.
We all know that people are not angels, and that they tend
to look after themselves and their own first. Yet we also
know that cooperation does occur and that our civilization
is based upon it. But, in situations where each individual has
an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever
develop?' "
The difficulties of obtaining cooperation are illustrated by
the prisoner's dilemma involving two players. Each player
may choose to cooperate or defect. And each makes this
choice without knowing what the other player will do. The
dilemma the players face is if they cooperate they both do
well, but if they both defect their position is worse. Yet either
player faces disaster if he is the "sucker" who cooperates
while the other defects. This is illustrated in Figure 1.






R=3, R=3 S=O, T=5
Smith cooperate Reward for Sucker's payoff, and
Mutual Cooperation Temptation to defect
defect T=5, S=O P= 1, P=1
Temptation to Punishment for mutual
Defect and Sucker's defection
Payoff
In the game one player, Jones, chooses either to cooperate or
defect, while the other player, Smith, simultaneously chooses
to cooperate or defect. These choices result in one of the
four outcomes shown in the matrix. If Jones and Smith coop-
erate they get the reward of mutual cooperation. If one
player defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets the
temptation payoff, while the other gets the sucker's payoff. If
they both defect they both receive the same punishment.
To illustrate this game, assume Smith and Jones have
been arrested and they face the choice of cooperating with
each other by keeping silent or defecting by confessing. The
temptation is to confess and implicate the other prisoner to
obtain a light punishment. If the other does not confess he is
the sucker who faces the full force of the law. When consulta-
tion between Smith and Jones is not possible the rational pris-
oner would confess. Both Smith and Jones would confess and
face the punishment associated with mutual defection.
The prisoner's dilemma explains a wide range of social
ills and the need for government. To take one homely exam-
ple, assume everyone desires nice grass in the park, hence all
should refrain from walking on the grass. "A" decides he
would save time by taking a short-cut across the grass. If only
A defects from this pattern, little harm is done. A is tempted
to break the convention, for he can save time and enjoy a
nice park, so long as everybody else continues to conform.
But all other park-users face the same temptation and soon
the grass is destroyed. The prisoner's dilemma illustrates
many problems, including making government work,
preventing crime, limiting pollution, protecting whales, estab-
150. Id. at 8.
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lishing arms control, and keeping the peace. Cooperation is
difficult and the pursuit of self-interest leads to an undesir-
able outcome. This situation could be described as the "back
of the invisible hand."15
Introducing the concept of a public good illuminates the
explanatory power of the prisoner's dilemma game. A public
good is characterized by "jointness of supply" and the "im-
possibility of exclusion." A good is jointly supplied if every-
body automatically gets some benefit and one person's enjoy-
ment of the good does not diminish the availability of the
good for someone else.' One loaf of bread is not in joint
supply since my eating it precludes your enjoyment of it. A
good is characterized by impossibility of exclusion if it is tech-
nically or economically infeasible to prevent persons from en-
joying it.""3 For example, the good of national defense bene-
fits all, and it is virtually impossible to exclude someone from
enjoying these benefits.
With the concept of a public good in mind, assume the
problem is developing cooperation to contribute or to pay a
fee. This is not difficult if failure to pay means one does not
receive something in return. For example, if one fails to pay
the price for bread, one cannot enjoy the bread. But for pub-
lic goods the problem of cooperation becomes severe. Why
should the rational individual pay for a public good when the
benefits could be obtained without payment, by being a free
rider. Unions, for example, have pressed hard for laws re-
quiring employees to pay union dues. Without such a provi-
sion the union faces a self-interested individual who avoids
paying union dues, becoming a free rider, yet enjoys the ef-
forts of the union in raising the salaries of all workers. Obvi-
ously a sufficient number of such people will destroy the
union effort.
Russell Hardin has demonstrated that the underlying
logic of the free rider problem is the same as that of the pris-
151. Adam Smith wrote that every individual pursuing his own inter-
ests "intends only his own gain, and he is this, as in many other cases led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention
.... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it." A. SMITH,
WEALTH OF NATIONS vol. II, bk 4., chap. 2, 423 (1869). The phrase quoted
in the text is taken from R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE AcTION 6 (1982).
152. HARDIN, supra note 151 at 17. Some such goods are, however,
crowded goods if the ratio of individual benefit to total cost declines as
more people use or enjoy the good. Id. at 44.
153. Id. at 17.
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oner's dilemma. This is accomplished with a similar matrix
involving an individual, John, and everyone except John,
called the Collective.'" (For the sake of simplicity assume the
Collective contains 9 people.) The payoffs in the matrix are
calculated in terms of benefits less cost. There are four possi-
ble results: (1) both John and Collective pay for the good; (2)
John pays, but Collective does not; (3) John does not pay, but
Collective does; (4) neither John nor the collective pay. If
John and every member of the Collective pay 1 unit the total
amount paid for the public good would be 10 units, which
shall be called the cost of the good. The benefit to each
member will be 2 units, for a total collective good of 20 units.
These assumptions produce these four situations.
Situation Costs Gross Benefits Net Benefits
Per Person Per Person
1. John pays 1 20+ 10=2 John nets: 2-1= 1
Collective pays* 9 Collective:** 2-1 = 1
Total: 10
2. John pays 1 2 +10=.2 John nets: .2-1=-.8
Collective does not pay 0 Collective: .2-0=.2
Total: 1
3. John does not pay 0 18+10=1.8 John nets: 1.8-0=1.8
Collective pays 9 Collective: 1.8-1 =.8
Total: 9
4. John does not pay 0 0-0=0 John nets: 0-0=0
Collective does not pay 0 Collective: 0-0=0
Total: 0
*"Collective pays" means each person in the collective pays 1 unit for a total
of 9.
**"Collective" means the net benefits for each individual in the collective.








Not Pay 1.8, 0.8 0,0
154. Id. at 25.
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In this situation the temptation is for the individual not to
pay, while hoping the members of the Collective continue to
pay. Since it is likely that all 10 people will make the same
calculation, the pursuit of individual interest results in the
failure to purchase the collective good which would benefit
all. As Hardin writes, "Since it is individuals who decide on
actions, and since each member of the group sees the game
matrix from the vantage of Individual [John], we can assume
that Collective's strategy will finally be whatever Individual's
strategy is, irrespective of what Collective's payoffs sug-
gest."155 Clearly an enforcement mechanism, such as, govern-
ment, is necessary to enforce payments from each member of
the society if the potential public good is to be realized.
B. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Education
The prisoner's dilemma game can be extended further
to education. Assuming that a certain kind of education is a
public good, or that all education is partially a public good,
then one can predict that this educational program would not
be provided unless self-interested people could be en-
couraged to pay their share its costs. 1" The government
could easily provide this by imposing a tax to pay for the edu-
cation program which could be publicly or privately
provided. 157
It has been argued that education is a public good that
cannot be provided through the private market - that pri-
vate educational services are unlikely to produce the kind of
educational program which includes the public good dimen-
sion. Henry Levin has stated that private education, even if
funded with public money and properly regulated would not
promote the value of toleration. This public good, he argues
can only be produced in a publicly operated school system.15
155. Id. at 26.
156. That a good is a public good provides only a necessary, not a
necessary and sufficient condition for governmental involvement in the
provision of the good. Other considerations may point to the undesirability
of governmental involvement in the provision of a particular good, the
kind of governmental activity needed may be itself especially costly thus
there may be a net loss rather than net gain from provision of the good.
157. Milton Friedman has proposed just such a system for providing
education. Money to pay for the education system would be raised through
the tax system. Then parents would be provided with a "voucher" to cover
at least part of the cost of purchasing educational services for their child in
the private market. FRIEDMAN, supra note 31 at 89.
158. LEVIN, supra note 31 at 635-36.
[Vol. 3
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Apart from questions of delivering education services,
the characteristics that can make a public school education
program a public good should be explored. With basic skills
such as reading, writing, and the ability to do arithmetic, it
can be argued that learning these skills is primarily a private
good, and the benefits of this redound only to the individual
child. Yet a "literate" society may be itself a public good, so
even skills which have a direct personal pay-off might be con-
sidered to have a public good dimension. Americans tradi-
tionally have supported an education program marked with
strong public good characteristics: The Constitution and
democratic government can be conceived of as a public good
- that is, democratic government is jointly supplied and ef-
forts to exclude residents from participation face difficul-
ties.11 A general belief by the populace in the Constitution is
also a public good. Hence, promoting through education a
belief in the Constitution, and democracy is promotion of a
public good and the provision of a public good. A climate of
trust in government and governmental officials is a public
good. A climate of equal respect for differing races and reli-
gions is also a public good. The republican notions of virtue
and patriotism are public goods whose benefits redound to
the benefit of others. A populace composed of people willing
to sacrifice self-interest for collective interests is another
form of public good. Even voting may involve a personal sac-
rifice of time and effort for a larger public good; hence the
rational individual may not be predisposed to vote. The edu-
cational effort to inculcate students so they believe they have
a moral duty to vote is another example of how education
seeks to promote a collective good. In sum, education to pro-
mote the constitution, trust in government, racial respect,
virtue, patriotism and the duty to vote involves the provision
of several public goods.
But the public education program may be interpreted as
involving other elements which directly confront the problem
of the social prisoner's dilemma. A first way is to hold up no-
torious defectors - traitors - for condemnation. Certainly
every school-age child has learned of Benedict Arnold. Stan-
dard American slogans such as "hang together or hang sepa-
rately" are taught. In this way instruction may be designed to
show the serious consequences of mutual defection. By em-
159. The attempt to exclude people from citizenship predictably
precipitates a political crisis. Cf., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856).
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phasizing, or exaggerating, the costs associated with non-
cooperation, the education program discourages this choice.
By exaggerating the benefits of "a more perfect union" -
domestic tranquility, the common defense, the general wel-
fare and the blessings of liberty - education encourages the
strategy of mutual cooperation.1 Extra-curricular activities
encourage actual cooperation among pupils. Next, to discour-
age defection schools will stress that "crime does not pay,"
and that criminals are indeed caught. This instruction en-
courages cooperation in two ways: first, it suggests that one
cannot successfully be a free rider; second, it builds trust by
telling students they can rely on others because they cannot
effectively defect.
Finally, teaching American history encourages coopera-
tion and the avoidance of defection in more subtle ways. Re-
search utilizing a computer-based prisoner dilemma game has
shown that when the game is played repeatedly with the same
players that the most "successful" strategy is Tit for Tat.""1
A Tit for Tat strategy involves starting with a cooperative
choice for the game; thereafter the player does whatever the
opponent did the previous game.1 2 If the opponent defects
in the first game, the Tit for Tat player defects in the second
game. With many reiterations of the game involving a variety
of other sophisticated strategies, the computer simulation
shows that Tit for Tat, a very cooperative strategy, wins the
tournament every time. Instruction in American history car-
ries the implicit message that a reasonably permanent popula-
tion and a permanent government will both be repeat players
in a society-wide prisoner dilemma game. Given this fact, the
implicit message is clear: cooperation is to the individual's
self-advantage.
The public goods discussed in this section are paid for in
two basic ways. Most obvious are the tax dollars raised to sup-
port the public education system. In addition, families pay for
the public good by sending their children to public schools,
where their personalities are shaped by public school officials.
Choices that children might otherwise have made are particu-
larly unattractive, so a price in freedom of choice, or through
deliberate socialization is paid as well.
It follows that if education is a public good for which'
people are paying tangibly and intangibly, then the logic of
160. U.S. CONST. preamble.
161. AXELROD, supra note 149.
162. Id. at 13, 31.
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the prisoner's dilemma comes into play. Some families will
want to defect and become free-riders. They can seek to do
this in two ways. The first is tax avoidance. The second
method of defection would be providing what might be de-
scribed as an education of defection, a subversive education.
This alternative education will take place by sending the
child to a private school or by enrolling the child in the pub-
lic school but then providing a counter-education program at
home. In both cases parents choosing these routes will hope
that other children will continue to be educated, law abiding
and self-sacrificing, but that their own children will be taught
values and beliefs different from those offered in the public
schools. In this way parents and their children can benefit
from the "virtue" and patriotic sacrifice of others while tak-
ing steps to avoid their children becoming a prisoner di-
lemma "sucker."
What might such an education program of self-defense
look like? It involves among other things, warning the child
not to be too trusting. Parents provide instruction of this
kind early on when they instruct their children to be wary of
"Mr. Danger-Stranger," that seemingly nice man who offers
candy and a ride home. Daughters are warned of the blan-
dishments and entreaties of their male dates. Such messages
will unavoidably have wider implications for children as they
are also instructed to be wary of advertising and of the rheto-
ric of politicians who promise anything before election and
never deliver. Children will not be encouraged to sacrifice
their individual self-interest for the public good. They will
not be encouraged to take on republican "virtue" nor be pa-
triotic. The private program might not instruct in racial re-
spect. Children in minority ethnic communities - whether
religious or racial - will be provided instruction in the his-
tory of their group, usually with an emphasis upon the perse-
cution and discrimination they have suffered, to warn the
child that this could happen again in overt and covert forms.
Children educated to have ethnic pride will in effect be told
that there is nothing worse than being a prisoner dilemma
"sucker." Similarly, too much trust of governmental officials
or an absolute commitment to obedience to law could lead to
the same bitter end. For example, those who always play by
the "rules of the game" can expect to be taken advantage of
by less-honorable players. Consider the person who pays
every jit and jot of tax arguably owed to the government,
while another arranges his or her income so it is never re-
ported to the government. In brief, this education in subver-
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sion might introduce many students to the prisoner's di-
lemma itself, warning them of the dangers they face if they
are, for example, too trusting. Students will be educated to
be critical and analytical - to question the promises of politi-
cians and the demands of government. But while parents may
also inform their children that the Tit for Tat strategy is best
in a reiterated game, these same parents may also warn their
children of two important points: First, the prisoner's di-
lemma game is not always reiterated with the same people,
hence playing Tit for Tat may simply leave one as the
"sucker." (In a single episode of a prisoner's dilemma game
the overriding temptation remains defection.) Second, being
a one time loser in some prisoner's dilemma games can be a
personal disaster from which the individual may never re-
cover, for example, trusting someone in a business deal in-
volving your life-fortune.
A moral argument will be advanced to justify the right of
parents to provide their children with an education for defec-
tion. Such behavior is easily understood - the parent wants
to protect the child. Another implication of this effort is pa-
rental resistance to state regulations which might prevent this
program of instruction.
In addition to parents, some public school teachers may
also want to defect in this societal prisoner's dilemma game.
The most obvious example may be found among those who
are both public school teachers and parents. Such people may
follow the prescribed curriculum designed to inculcate pupils
but send their own children to private schools or counter-ed-
ucate them at home.16 More radical teachers may go further
by interjecting their counter-culture voice into the class-
room.'" These teachers may feel a kinship with classroom
children, thus treating them as if they were their own chil-
dren. For example, teachers who share the same minority
ethnic background as their pupils may feel a need to instruct
them, despite the formal curriculum, not to become the
"suckers" of society's prisoner's dilemma game. The effort to
introduce black studies into the education program can be
seen as a concrete example of this concern.
163. Cf Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied,
515 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1975), 429 U.S. 165 (1976); Brantley v. Surles, 718
F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1983) and 765 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1985); Stough v.
Crenshaw Cty. Bd. of Educ., 579 F. Supp. 1091 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affid,
744 F.2d 1479 (11 th Cir. 1984).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 179-83.
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In summary, the desire to inculcate and resistance to this
may be understood as a manifestation of a prisoner's dilemma
game involving a public good. Interpreting the American
educational tradition in these terms provides a better under-
standing of both features of the tradition: the effort to incul-
cate and to instruct in critical thinking. It also makes possible
the realization that, so long as the desire for the public good
remains politically salient, there will be a demand for a sub-
versive education. These two dimensions of the tradition are
inextricably bound together.
C. The Moral Right to Educate for Defection
Can there be a moral right to instruct children subver-
sively? One approach to answering this question is to examine
the duties parents owe to their children. If it could be estab-
lished that parents owe a duty to provide a subversive educa-
tion, then it would seem to follow that parents have the
moral right to provide that education. This conclusion is
based on the assumption that a moral duty entails the moral
right to fulfill the duty. In the argument that follows it is as-
sumed that subversive education serves the child by helping
the child not to become the "sucker" in a prisoner's dilemma
game. This form of education helps the child protect him or
herself from risks and harms.
That parents may have a moral obligation to provide
their children with a subversive education is seen by first ex-
amining the duties a landowner owes guests. People who are
specifically invited to enter the property are owed the duty of
being warned of dangers on the property.""' This legal duty
coincides with the moral duty not to harm people by luring
them into danger without fair warning. Parents are in a simi-
lar situation for they have invited, so to speak, the child into
this world. Parents have brought the child involuntarily into
this economic, political and social system, so it is morally in-
cumbent upon them to provide the child with fair notice of
the dangers into which he or she has been thrust.'" Stating
the point differently, we all share in the moral duty not to
harm."" Parents who fail to alert the child of dangers expose
the child to risks that could be avoided through education. If
165. W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 419 (5th ed. 1984).
166. Cf Olafson, Rights and Duties in Education, in DOYLE, supra note
42 at 173.
167. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 25 (1973); J. FEINBERG, HARM TO
OTHERS 11, 26 (1984).
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a risk were to materialize and the child were injured, it would
be proper to say, because of the special relationship between
parent and child, that the failure to educate was the cause of
the harm. The parent violated the principle of not harming
by not educating.168
I need to consider at this point an important argument
which seems to rebut the conclusions that parents have a duty
not to harm, thus also the right to provide a subversive edu-
cation. The rebuttal is that no one, including parents, has a
right to behave in a way that avoids harm to one individual at
the expense of the public good. Various answers might be
constructed to respond to this claim involving calculations
balancing individual harms and that damage to the public
good. I want to avoid this sort of answer to suggest a re-
sponse that is more intuitive and perhaps will resonate with
more people.
It has been stated that a person acts within morality
when he acts with something less than impartiality toward
himself.169
[N]o reasonable morality asks us to look upon ourselves as
merely plausible candidates for the distribution of the at-
tention and resources which we command, plausible candi-
dates whose entitlements to our own concern is no greater
in principle than that of any other human being. Such a
doctrine may seem edifying, but on reflection it strikes us as
merely fanatical.""
The logical extension of this is that we are "authorized to
prefer identified persons standing" close to us above the in-
terests of humanity in general."' "One who provides an ex-
pensive education for his children surely cannot be blamed
for not using these resources to alleviate famine in some dis-
tant land." '
Therefore, it is not only consonant with, but also required
by, an ethics for human beings that one be entitled first of
all to reserve an area of concern for oneself and then to
move out freely from that area if one wishes to lavish that
168. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 143, 159-63, 167, 180 (1984).
169. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976).
170. Id. at 1066-67.




concern on others to whom one stands in concrete, per-
sonal relations.
17 3
Thus, "we recognize an authorization to take the interests of
particular concrete persons more seriously and to give them
priority over the interest of the wider collectivity."11 7 4 Such a
priority would certainly include taking steps to protect the
child from harm by warning the child of the dangers of un-
critical acceptance of the official program of inculcation of-
fered in the public schools.
These points can be illuminated by stating them from a
different perspective. A child who had not been educated
subversively would, upon reaching maturity and having suf-
fered the pain of being a prisoner's dilemma "sucker," fault
the parent for not having been more subversive ("You should
have told me. Why didn't you warn me?") The child who has
not been educated subversively has not been provided with
the information and analytical skills needed for self-defense.
Self-defense is an interest so strong it has been recognized as
a moral right. 17 1 It would thus seem that a parental effort to
prepare a child to defend him or herself is itself a legitimate
activity.
Even assuming there are moral reasons for granting indi-
viduals discretion to use their resources first on those closest
to them, the difficult issue is who, in what ways, and how
much.1 76 "[A]lmost no one believes that totally individualistic
selfishness is 'good' either. 1 7 7 This point may be conceded
but nothing suggests that a subversive education is a form of
"totally individualistic selfishness," nor that the effect of such
an education is so destructive of the interests of others as to
make such education immoral. Subversive education is an ed-
ucation in cautions, in warning notices. Children are not
taught to always be selfish, to always deceive and defect.
They are taught that others may be deceptive and may de-
fect. And they are instructed that in certain circumstances,
when there is a strong likelihood of others defecting, it may
be irrational not to defect yourself. Parents may instruct their
children in, Tit-for-Tat, a not wholly selfish form of educa-
tion. Furthermore, warning the child of the dangers associ-
ated with being in a prisoner's dilemma game is only deliver-
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1066.
175. See, R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 102, 120ff (1974).
176. Dauer and Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE
L.J. 573, 575 (1977).
177. Id.
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ing a message about reality. To blame the parent for being
socially destructive for delivering this message is to "shoot
the messenger." Besides, preparation for self-defense is gen-
erally acknowledged to be morally permissible, despite the
fact that actually defending oneself can have adverse conse-
quences for others - particularly an aggressor. 178
Though some may concede that parents are authorized
to protect their children from harm, these people may object
that the public school teacher is not so authorized. The
teacher was hired to inculcate the pupils, and defection from
that task is insubordination and a breach of contract. It
makes little sense to authorize teachers to educate subver-
sively when hired by a school whose purpose it is to incul-
cate. 79 This argument is difficult to answer. Nevertheless
there are reasons for recognizing a limited right to academic
freedom, a right to introduce materials intended to provide
protection for the pupil.
Again, a duty implies a right. In this case the teacher has
a duty not to harm. Both principles are at risk when a curric-
ulum is taught that will set that child up to be a prisoner di-
lemma "sucker." It might be argued that if the school pro-
gram is successful there will be no defectors, hence no
trusting "suckers." But there is no guarantee that the curric-
ulum will be successful with all pupils, some people will be
educated for defection and subversion in a private school or
at home, and adult immigrants will not have been educated
in the American public school. Thus a teacher who insists on
inculcating without adding the "warning label" that "un-
thinking acceptance of the school program may be dangerous
to your well-being" is directing the pupils toward harm. Fur-
thermore, a teacher who does not believe in the principles
and values being taught is engaged in professional mendacity
and violates another moral principle, the duty not to lie. 8
At a minimum, the teacher who teaches only the official sylla-
bus rents out his or her reputation in support of morally un-
certain propositions. Consider for example the teacher who,
consistent with the course syllabus, instructs pupils that they
have a duty to sacrifice personal interests for the state. This
teacher would use his or her moral force to perpetuate a doc-
178. See, Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 356
(1987). Cf, J. J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 33-48 (1986).
179. Goldstein, supra note 6.




trine whose truth is far from certain 8 1 In sum, these consid-
erations support the conclusion that public school teachers
have a duty not merely to inculcate as the state prescribes,
and the existence of this duty implies the right not to do so.
But it may be asked, how can a teacher be permitted to
instruct pupils in a way that harms the realization of public
goods? If a teacher is viewed as a professional with students as
clients, an answer becomes clearer. Teachers, like lawyers,
morally must on occasion do things for the people they serve
even ifthis means harming the interests of others."' 2 But per-
haps this claim is too strong. It may be that teachers are not
required to teach subversively, but that, if they decide they
should because of moral principle, they are morally author-
ized to do so. Teachers may come to view their pupils as their
"children," or as friends. A reasonable human morality per-
mits people to give the interests of particular persons priority
over the interests of the wider collectivity. Thus, if teachers
are permitted to become friends with their pupils they also
should be permitted to teach them subversively.
Finally, the very concept of a "teacher" entails the possi-
bility of subversive teaching.1 88 Great teaching opens the
mind and frees the spirit. A liberal education is intended to
liberate the mind for new possibilities. Because this is so
much a part of the western tradition, public schools misrepre-
sent the function of their employees by using the title
"teacher" while seeking to deny the possibility of subversive
instruction. This is a form of fraud, since people employed to
read strictly from a prepared text are best called actors, press
secretaries, pitchmen, or agents of a propaganda ministry,
not "teacher."
IV. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT FOR PARENTAL AND
TEACHER RIGHTS
The previous section supported the moral wisdom of rec-
ognizing parental and public school teacher rights to provide
children with a subversive education. These moral rights
should also be constitutional rights. After justifying a
181. A.J. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS
(1979).
182. A.H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETH-
ics 139-141 (1980).
183. Getting students to love learning for its own sake and encourag-
ing students to think on their own are among the central purposes teachers
say they pursue. D.C. LORTIE, SCHOOLTEACHER 114 (1975).
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noninterpretist approach to constitutional interpretation, an
argument is made for constitutional recognition of the right
of parents and teachers to educate subversively.
A. Interpretism and Noninterpretism
Developing an interpretation of the Constitution in a
particular controversy is a three stage process. First, a gen-
eral theory of interpretation needs to be adopted; second,
that theory is used to decide what method of constitutional
interpretation is required or permitted by the Constitution
for use by the Supreme Court; and, third, that approach to
interpretation is used to resolve the particular conflict.
In the first stage a choice must be made between the in-
terpretist and noninterpretist approach to constitutional in-
terpretation.'" At this stage one cannot turn to the Constitu-
tion to choose a theory of interpretation because the whole
process would become circular: one cannot use the Constitu-
tion to choose a method of interpretation, for one needs a
method of interpretation to decide what the Constitution
means in the first place. The process of choosing a theory of
constitutional interpretation must begin outside the Constitu-
tion, - and is itself a form of noninterpretism.
Having chosen approach x, one moves to the second
stage by asking the following question: what method of inter-
pretation may the Supreme Court use in interpreting the
Constitution? The Court was created by the Constitution and
its operation, including its mode of constitutional interpreta-
tion, is to be determined by the Constitution. Thus, approach
x is used to determine the correct method of constitutional
interpretation. Hence, it is possible that at stage one
noninterpretism is the correct approach, and in applying this
approach to stage two, it is concluded that the Constitution
permits or requires the Supreme Court to use interpretism.
Thus, in stage three interpretism might be used to resolve
particular controversies.
Where does one turn in stage one to select a method of
interpretation? There are a limited number of possibilities:
the theory of language, the theory of texts in general, the
theory of legal and constitutional texts, and political and so-
cial philosophy. 85 Using such materials, which is the better
position - interpretism or noninterpretism?
184. The distinctive characteristics of each of these approaches is dis-
cussed, infra at text accompanying notes 190-96.
185. See Dworkin, supra'note 139.
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A definitional problem must be addressed before choos-
ing between interpretism and noninterpretism. Table 4 cate-
gorizes theories of constitutional interpretation, first, in
terms of the sources of the materials and, second, in terms of
the theory's attitude toward the possibility of arriving at a de-
terminate answer. The theories in the column marked exter-
nal are those which describe or prescribe that judicial discre-
tion should be constrained by laws, principles, or policies
which are external to the justice's own will, or found in an
authoritative text. "Internal theories" would not confine ju-
dicial discretion to materials external to the justice's own will.
Thus, internal theories admit of the possibility that the jus-
tice's own values will or should be decisive in reaching a deci-
sion, especially in those cases where the external materials
are unclear. Turning to the first row, these theories hold out
the possibility that a justice can find a single right answer. In
the second row are the theories which state that a justice may
not find a single right answer in all cases, as well as those
theories which argue that the law is radically indeterminate,




Right Answer (1) Bork (2) Perry
Dworkin Fishkin
Indeterminacy (3) Wellington (4) Critical Legal
Monaghan Studies
A more complete comparison of the work of theorists
such as Bork and Perry will be provided. Theorists in cell 1
believe that justices are and should be bound by constitu-
tional materials external to them and that using those materi-
als makes possible the finding of a right answer in virtually all
cases. However, these theorists disagree as to what materials
a judge may use in reaching a decision. For example, Robert
Bork insists that the justices should primarily seek guidance
from the original intent of the framers, whereas Ronald
Dworkin rejects this approach and would have the justices re-
fer to principles of justice and philosophy not explicitly em-
bodied in the Constitution. 8 Theorists in cell 2 accept the
186. Bork, supra note 3; Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, 34 N.Y. REv.
oF BooKs 36, D17 (1987).
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reality that judges may use their own values in reaching a de-
cision. But they also believe that using the power of reason
can yield answers which are more than mere subjective pref-
erences. 18 7 The theorists in cell 3 require a justice to use ex-
ternal materials, but because of the difficulties of working
with these materials admit the possibility that there may be
no single right answer to a particular case.'" Finally, in cell 4
are those theorists who argue that legal texts, precedent, and
tradition are so internally conflicted, and riddled with such
general value incoherence, that justices must unavoidably fall
back onto their own values. When they do so the resulting
choice is a sheer matter of arbitrary will, an exercise of
power. 8 9
Interpretist legal theorists are found primarily in cell 1,
with softer versions in cell 2. Noninterpretists are found in
cell 3.
Interpretism in the harder version stresses reliance on
the original intent of the framers and employs a distinctive
theory of language and legal texts. 9 Advocates of original
intent reject the idea that the words of the Constitution can
be understood independently of the intent of the framers. 9
To the extent there is a conflict between the apparent mean-
ing of the words and the intent of the framers, the intent of
the framers is supreme. Furthermore, the intent of the fram-
ers is expressed in specific examples of what must be permit-
ted to the legislatures and what the legislatures must not do.
For example, the intent of the free speech clause of the first
amendment is understood to prohibit certain governmental
187. J. FISHKIN, BEYOND SUBJECTIVE MORALITY (1984); Fiskin, Liberal
Theory and the Problems ofJustification, in JUSTIFICATION 207 (J. Pennock and
J. Chapman eds. (1986); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
188. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353 (1981);
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE
L.J. 221 (1973).
189. See, e.g., Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dwor-
kin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1986); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihil-
ism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 561 (1983); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
190. The comments which follow in the text are based on R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977); Bork supra note 3; Berger, New Theories of "Interpreta-
tion": The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986); Mor-
ris, Interpretive and Noninterpretive Constitutional Theory, 94 ETHICS 501
(1984).
191. C.f. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
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practices such as the prior restraint of political speech. The
framers' intent is not understood to further general purposes
or values, nor is the framers' intent to be broadened with the
use of loosely drawn analogies. And if the framers were silent
as to a particular individual right, then the legislature is free
to act. Hence, it is impermissible to ask hypothetical ques-
tions as to what the framers would have done had they con-
sidered a particular issue. An important conclusion derived
from this approach is that the framers intended to prohibit
very few things to the legislatures. "[C]onservatives like Bork
treat rights as islands surrounded by a sea of government
powers . . . ."'9' Crucial for the interpretists is that original
intent is to be followed regardless of the social consequences
of doing so. If silence in the history of the drafting of the
Constitution points towards the conclusion that the legisla-
ture may, for example, impose racial segregation, then the
Court must permit the legislation to stand regardless of its
adverse consequences or immorality. It would be impermissi-
ble for a justice to turn to principles of justice and morality
to decide a case contrary to the original intent of the fram-
ers. In brief, interpretism is a special form of positivism that
employs a narrow notion of a rule of recognition,1" namely,
that only the legislature and the people acting through
proper Constitutional amendment procedures can make law.
Individual rights are only those found in the Constitution,
and are interpreted with the use of historical materials defin-
ing the intent of the framers. While there may be other gen-
eral moral and human rights, unless embodied in the Consti-
tution they are not capable of judicial enforcement.
The softer versions of interpretism analogize constitu-
tional interpretation to statutory interpretation. They con-
sider the possibility that a constitutional provision may have a
broad and general purpose and they are more willing to place
weight upon the text itself as evidence of original intent.'
These interpretists accept a notion of language that admits of
the possibility that words can and do carry a meaning some-
what independent of the intent of the author. 95
Noninterpretism shares with the soft version of inter-
192. S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITIMON 32 (1987).
193. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961).
194. Monaghan, supra note 188 at 377, 391; Morris, supra note 190.
See, J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
195. Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
797 (1982).
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pretism a belief that words can often carry a meaning apart
from the intent of the author.1" But noninterpretists also
consider the social consequences of alternative interpreta-
tions of the constitution, tradition, morality, and political and
social philosophy. Noninterpretists reject the notion that the
meaning of the Constitution was frozen the moment the
words sprung from the pens of the framers. They seek to
adapt the Constitution to contemporary circumstances.
Noninterpretists assume the Constitution protects the rights
expressly mentioned in the text as well as many rights not
mentioned. To the extent noninterpretists rely on the intent
of the framers they state that intent in general terms. By us-
ing analogy, counterfactual analysis, and other techniques of
analysis found in the common law, they expand the intent of
the framers to new situations. Silence in the constitutional
text does not create a presumption favoring the permissibility
of legislation. Vagueness allows for judicial discretion to clar-
ify. Just as interpretists conclude that noninterpretists flee
from the authoritative constraints of the Constitution,
noninterpretists accuse interpretists of an irrational flight
from inevitable and desirable judicial discretion.
Unfortunately, neither the interpretists nor noninter-
pretists have spent much effort developing the needed "stage
one" arguments for their positions. Developing these argu-
ments is based on inferences from their published writings.
Interpretists seem to rely on four arguments to support their
view that an interpretist approach should be used at stage
one (an approach which they also use at stage two to con-
clude that the Constitution requires the Court to use inter-
pretism.) These four arguments are (1) language of a text
cannot be understood apart from understanding the intent of
the author, (2) the Constitution is a contract and contracts
must be interpreted in reliance upon the intent of the au-
thors, (3) not turning to the intent of the authors invites the
interpreter to sail upon the sea of morality without direction
since moral conclusions are inevitably open to challenge, and
196. The comments in the text are based on, Perry, supra note 139;
Fallon, supra note 130; Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659
(1987); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation BeJustified, 73 CALiF. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Grey, The Constitu-
tion as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 79 MicH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Brest, The Fundamental Rights Contro-
versy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution? 27
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
[Vol. 3
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
(4) "the people" who framed the Constitution and those who
ratified it simultaneously decreed that the Constitution
should be approached using the interpretist mode of analysis
and that this decision should be respected. Each of these ar-
guments is open to serious question.
The first argument flies in the face of the reality that
people communicate by assuming that language has certain
conventional meanings. The meaning of words is not totally
dependent upon the particular psychology of the speaker.
Second, to call the Constitution a contract is but a poor meta-
phor. Contracts are adopted and bind only the parties to the
contract, not third parties and future generations. 197 Third,
the radical subjectivity towards morality embodied in the
third argument is not widely shared either among the general
public or philosophers. Fourth, there is no evidence available
directly supporting the conclusion that those who ratified the
Constitution also adopted an authoritative approach to its in-
terpretation. 198 In any event, the fourth argument embraces
the value of majoritarian rule, as if it were not open to the
corrosive attack of moral skepticism embraced in the third
argument.
Finally, it can be argued that people operating at stage
one would not pick interpretism as the authoritative method
for constitutional interpretation because of its many difficul-
ties. For example, a standard criticism of interpretism is that
it does not adequately specify whose intent is original and au-
thoritative - who were the framers?1" How can a single in-
tent have been formed by the large and disparate group in-
volved in drafting and ratifying the Constitution?0 0 What is
properly evidence of intent - only the official reports of pro-
ceedings or private letters, or speeches, or essays published in
newspapers?0 1 Why should this intent be interpreted only
197. Simon, supra note 196, at 1496-1499.
198. Macedo, supra note 192 at 17. There were, of course, tradi-
tional practices for interpreting legal documents at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original In-
tent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985). But the conclusion which the
interpretists do not provide support for is that these traditions were
adopted by a majority vote as the appropriate methods for interpreting the
Constitution.
199. Macedo, supra note 192 at 11.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 12.
19881
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
with respect to specific examples of what is prohibited, in-
stead of interpreted in broad terms?2
Assuming, however, that it is reasonable to use an inter-
pretist approach at stage one, this approach must be em-
ployed to determine, in stage two, the method of interpreta-
tion the Constitution requires of the Supreme Court. One
must rely on the original intent of the framers to learn what
they intended for the Supreme Court. Interpretists offer a
long list of stage two arguments to support the conclusion
that the Court must follow interpretism: (1) historical evi-
dence supports a constitutional requirement that the Court
use interpretism;2 8 (2) the framers embodied in the Constitu-
tion an ideology of majoritarianism, hence, the Court has a
limited role in protecting individual rights; (3) the framers
embraced a notion of the rule of law which limits the judici-
ary in developing new rights; in this tradition the courts must
only discover the law, not make law; and, (4) there is evi-
dence in the Constitution that interpretism is to be used. The
method for amending the Constitution is offered to support
an original intent that the Constitution is to be reformed in
only this way, and not by the judiciary. Article VI contains
the provision that "[a]ll Debts contracted and Engagements
entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
be as valid against the United States under this Constitution,
as under the Confederation. '2" This provision, it can be ar-
gued, should be interpreted in light of its plain meaning, be-
cause it would be unfair and socially harmful to disappoint
the expectations of people who acted in reliance on such a
commitment. 6
These "stage two" arguments for interpretism can be re-
butted. First, Berger's evidence for an original intent to re-
quire interpretism is weak. Though he quotes James Wilson
as saying at the constitutional convention that law may be de-
structive or dangerous and yet not be unconstitutional,20
Berger fails to give sufficient weight to Federalist Paper Num-
ber 78 in which Hamilton says that the Court will rule uncon-
stitutional laws which are contrary to the "tenor," or "mani-
fest tenor" of the Constitution. 7 Second, the fact that the
202. Id. at 14-15.
203. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 359-367 (1969). See
also supra cites in note 190.
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
205. Simon, supra note 196, at 1502.
206. R. BERGER, supra note 190.
207. MADISON, JAY, HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, No 78, 505 (1865).
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Constitution embraces a Supreme Court and a Bill of Rights
is evidence the framers did not write into the Constitution
the majoritarian ideology embraced by interpretists.I 8
Third, the theory of law which the interpretists claim the
framers embraced is inconsistent with a tradition the framers
lived with, the common law. In this tradition principles of law
are changed over time by the judiciary.20 9 Four, contrary to
the claims of the interpretists, the Constitution suggests the
need for noninterpretism more than for interpretism. The
Ninth Amendment recognizes that people retain rights not
expressly mentioned in the Constitution.210 And the broad
language of the due process and equal protection clauses in-
vite a latitudinarian construction.1
In sum, the "stage one" arguments fail to establish that
interpretism is the appropriate approach to constitutional in-
terpretation. Even if these arguments were convincing, using
interpretism to establish that the Constitution requires the
Court to follow interpretism also fails. Thus, by default,
noninterpretism emerges as the correct conclusion of both
the "stage one" and "stage two" analysis. There are, how-
ever, additional reasons for accepting noninterpretism. At
"stage one" noninterpretism is more likely to assure results
that square with widely shared notions of justice; a method of
interpretation that produces just conclusions is to be pre-
ferred. It could also be argued that noninterpretism better
fits with our experience with language as having meaning not
solely determined by the author's intent. Authors must live
and die by the words they have chosen, so they take pains to
speak and write carefully. At "stage two" noninterpretism
must be deployed to reach the method of analysis permitted
or required of the Supreme Court. A noninterpretist inter-
pretation of Article III suggests the Court is given permission
to use noninterpretism. The Court is granted the authority to
exercise "judicial power," a phrase of great sweep that can be
understood to embrace noninterpretist authority.1 2 The fact
the Constitution opens with a preamble outlining general
purposes suggests the desire to have the document read
208. S. MACEDO, supra note 192, at 22, 25.
209. Simon, supra note 196 at 1527.
210. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
212. "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court .... " U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 1.
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broadly. 1 Finally, the existence at the time of the writing of
the Constitution and today of a tradition of a "higher law"
further supports finding a constitutional authorization for the
Supreme Court to use noninterpretism "
B. Stage Three - Parental Rights
In stage three a new rationale for the recognized right of
parents to control the upbringing of their children is offered
using noninterpretist techniques. 5 This argument considers
the constitutional text, original intent, precedent, practical
considerations, and moral theory.
The right of a parent to educate the child is not ex-
pressly mentioned in the Constitution. An interpretist would
turn to the historical record to learn if any of the expressly
mentioned rights in the Constitution were intended to pro-
tect parents from state interference in the upbringing of
their children." Lack of such evidence suggests to inter-
pretists complete legislative authority to enter the area of
state control of private education. But a noninterpretist need
not ground individual rights in a specific historical example.
A noninterpretist can begin counterfactually by asking
whether the framers would agree that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments provide protection against certain forms
of state intrusion between parent and child. The answer
would most certainly be "yes," for these amendments were
adopted against a background in which the family was a pillar
of American society. Education was in both the colonial pe-
riod and far into the nineteenth-century primarily a family
affair .217
In rebuttal it might be argued that the Constitution was
drafted in an age of compulsory education laws and nothing
in the text or in original intent suggests the Constitution was
written to abolish these laws.2 " But such laws addressed total
213. "We the People of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." U.S. CONST. preamble.
214. E.S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1928). See, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 165-78.
216. Bork, supra note 3 at 11.
217. L.A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
1607-1783 (1970); Spring, supra note 22.
218. W.F. AIKMAN & L. KOTIN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 11 (1980).
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parental neglect of the formal education of their children.
Their acceptance cannot be seen as endorsement of state au-
thority to redirect the ideological direction of a program al-
ready being provided by the parent.21' Certainly the framers
would not have approved of state regulation of the religious
content of parental education. Thus it would seem, by anal-
ogy, that the framers would also at least cast a skeptical eye
toward regulation of the ideological content of that educa-
tion program. They would embrace a strong presumption
against such state regulation."' Modern-day precedent also
supports continued recognition of parental rights and a
strong presumption against state interference with those
rights.2 1
Our earlier discussion of the prisoner's dilemma and ed-
ucation can support a recognition of the parental right. Par-
ents have not merely an interest in transmitting their culture
and vision to their children, they also have a strong desire
and legitimate interest to protect them from harm. So strong
is this interest that no matter what the state may do to regu-
late the parental effort to educate the child for survival, par-
ents would "defect" and find a way to educate subversively.
Provision of a subversive education is not a matter of paren-
tal taste and personal predilection. It is at the center of what
it means to be a parent. Continued constitutional protection
of the status of parent and parenting unavoidably entails ad-
mitting to the continued provision of an education for defec-
tion, whether it be done legally or not. Just as the attempt to
prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages
proved impossible, an attempt to block subversive education,
219. Yudof makes a misleading comparison when he writes that a
state compulsory education law "interferes more significantly with parental
autonomy" than a law as in the Pierce case which requires pupils to attend
public schools. YUDOF, infra note 230, at 889. State interference with a par-
ent's decision wholly not to educate the child is a different kind of interfer-
ence with parental autonomy from interference to control the ideological
content of the program the parent is in fact providing.
220. See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establish-
ment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979).
221. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981); Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984). C.f. Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
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as long as parents are allowed to act as parents, would prove
to be impossible."'
But practical considerations are not the only ones sup-
porting recognition of a right to educate subversively. It is
morally wrong to allow legislatures to interfere with a paren-
tal effort to protect the child from harm when those efforts
have no immediate harmful consequences. Protecting a child
from harm is a parent's moral right. And should not the Con-
stitution be read to protect the moral right of parents to edu-
cate subversively?22 The Constitution protects other moral
rights, such as the right of free speech and the right to indi-
vidual religious conscience. 2 If the parental right is not to
be similarly protected, a case would have to be made to dis-
tinguish between protection for these moral rights but not
for the moral right of the parent. The parental right is no
less important to the individual parent than the rights of free
speech and individual conscience. The parental right is no
more potentially harmful than the others. The parental right
enjoys a longer history and tradition of recognition. The pa-
rental right is not any less well-grounded in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5
The parental right may also be considered from the per-
spective of the child. The child who has not been educated
subversively has not been provided with the information and
analytical skills needed for self-defense, a moral right.26 It
follows that interference with acquiring the tools for self-de-
fense frustrates a moral right and is presumptively immoral.
Since there are no good reasons to deny a child the opportu-
nity to learn self-defense, the conclusion also follows that a
law that seeks to block subversive education is itself im-
moral.127 Furthermore, the notion of self-defense-the de-
fense of life, liberty, and property-is certainly a constitu-
tionally rooted interest. The very notion of a "right" to life,
liberty, and property entails a right to defend these inter-
222. U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII and XXI.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 165-78.
224. J. RAWLS, supra note 214; F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
227. An education for self-defense has, of course, consequences
which may seem to provide the justification for a law blocking such an edu-
cation program. But other forms of self-defense, e.g., killing an assailant,
also have consequences yet traditional morality and law continues to recog-
nize the right to defend oneself and, what is more relevant for these pur-
poses, the right to acquire the skills and weapons necessary for acting in
self-defense if the need should arise. See Wasserman, supra note 178.
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ests. 22' The right to these things is drained of meaning if the
act of preparing to defend oneself is denied. Preparation for
self-defense is a constitutionally fundamental interest, and
recognition of the parental right to educate subversively
serves to protect that interest.
This analysis of the parental right to educate privately
helps support the Court's decision in Pierce, a case which has
been questioned because of the Court's repudiation of its use
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in
that case. Commentators have provided useful ways of sup-
porting this opinion, but these are incomplete. Professor Ar-
ons has argued that the parental right can be justified as a
form of speech protected by the first amendment.2 9 Dean
Yudof rejects this argument and claims that Pierce can be de-
fended only as a way of checking the otherwise overweening
power of the state to reach all students with a program of
state-directed inculcation."' Arons was correct in recogniz-
ing an individual parental interest in the right to re-educate
his or her child. Because he did not fully explore those inter-
ests, he could not demonstrate that those interests go far be-
yond what we traditionally think of as an interest in freedom
of speech. Yudof was also correct in pointing to the dangers
of a state monopoly of education, but his analysis also did not
go far enough in recognizing the child's interest in the capac-
ity for self-defense. A parental right to educate subversively is
rooted in all these concerns, but especially in the interest to
protect the child from harm. Perhaps this is why the right is
generally accepted as fundamental and has been traditionally
recognized in law and morality.
C. Stage Three - A Teacher's Right to Limited Academic
Freedom
Developing a constitutional argument for a limited right
to academic freedom for public school teachers is a more dif-
ficult task. Unlike the case of parental rights, the Supreme
228. Cf id. at 361-62.
229. Arons writes that, "Reading Pierce as a First Amendment case
and taking account of the nature of schooling suggests that Pierce principles
reach the basic value choices on which school policy and practices are
based. The result of such a reading is that it is the family and not the
political majority which the Constitution empowers to make such schooling
decisions." Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46
HARV. EDuC. REV. 76, 78 (1976).
230. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 888-91 (1979).
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Court has never announced that public school teachers have
a right of academic freedom, and there exists a powerful ar-
gument for not recognizing such a right. Professor Goldstein
made the case against academic freedom by arguing that, if
the public schools are vehicles for the inculcation of the
young, it makes little sense to recognize a right of those hired
to inculcate to subvert the required curriculum by teaching
something different.28 Nevertheless, a plausible case can be
made for a public school teacher's limited right to academic
freedom.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly recognize a
right to academic freedom, the framers of the free speech
clause may have intended to protect academic freedom.
There appears, however, to be no evidence to support such a
conclusion. First, during the colonial period the notion of ac-
ademic freedom was unknown at the elementary-secondary
level. 2  Second, when the first amendment was drafted
American colleges were only beginning to move away from a
wholly sectarian education toward the provision of a secular
education and the acceptance of professors preaching some-
thing other than the prescribed orthodoxy. 8 A strong no-
tion of academic freedom protecting the professor's freedom
to teach, Lehrfreiheit, only came to the United States from
Germany later in the nineteenth-century.' Third, there was
no public school system to which the right could be ex-
tended, and the notion of a public school teacher's right to
academic freedom could not have been considered by the
framers. But while the framers may not have intended to pro-
tect academic freedom, there is no evidence that they in-
tended the Court should withhold constitutional recognition.
Given the inconclusive nature of these basic constitu-
tional materials, precedent gains importance. The relevant
cases may be divided into four categories representing four
different dimensions of academic freedom for the individual
teacher.2 5 The first two categories include (1) those cases
231. Goldstein, supra note 6.
232. H. BEALE, supra notes 19 and 40.
233. See generally R. HOFSTADER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF
THE COLLEGE (1955). The American Association of University Professors
was only formed in 1915. American Association of University Professors,
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE 33 (L. Joughin ed. 1967).
234. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1048 (1968).




dealing with classroom expression of the teacher's personal
views and (2) those dealing with the introduction of contro-
versial teaching methods, subjects, and reading materials.
The two other categories include, (3) opinions addressing the
exclusion of teachers merely because of their beliefs and not
because of what they said or did in the classroom,13 and (4)
those opinions addressing dismissals because of the teacher's
political activities outside the school or the teacher's public
expression of criticism of other school personnel and school
policies. " 7 It is the opinions in the first two categories which
are of relevance to this discussion.
236. In the third category are those cases which deal with the ques-
tion, among other things, of whether a Communist may be a public school
teacher. The Court's answer has been that teachers may not be barred
from the classroom for even active membership in the Communist party
unaccompanied by proof of a specific intent to further the unlawful goals
of the organization. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
See also, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). C.f, Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979). In a series of other decisions the Court struck down
for vagueness the "disclaimer oath" which required the oath taker to swear
that he or she was not or ever had been a member of the Communist party
or otherwise lent his or her aid, advice, counsel, support, or influence to it.
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). Oaths
requiring the oath taker to uphold the Constitution remain constitutionally
permissible. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Connell v. Higgen-
botham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). Similarly mere political affiliation with a
party different from that to which a majority of the board belongs is also
an impermissible basis for dismissal. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
237. Open participation in civil rights activities or the advocacy of
gay rights has been protected. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educa-
tion of City of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd by an
equally divided court, 105 S.Ct. 1858 (1985); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
177 (4th Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). C.f, McMullen v.
Carons, 754 F.2d 936 (1lth Cir. 1985). Public employees in general and
school teachers in particular have been protected against dismissal even if
they publicly criticize the school board, their superiors, or co-workers so
long as certain conditions have been met. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also, Mt.
Healthy City School Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
The conditions, roughly speaking, are: (1) the speech must be about a mat-
ter of "public concern" and, on balance, considering a variety of factors,
e.g., impact of the speech on working the relationship between teacher and
supervisor, it has not had a sufficiently adverse effect to justify saying it not
"protected speech"; and (2) the speech must not be false nor spoken know-
ing it was false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the claim.
For a detailed exploration of these conditions see, van Geel, supra note 7 at
82-88.
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No Supreme Court decision has dealt directly with the
problems raised in the first two categories. The justices have,
however, thrown a bouquet at academic freedom by describ-
ing teachers as the "priests of our democracy."' 38 Similarly,
in striking down loyalty oaths for teachers in institutions of
higher education the Court said the classroom must remain a
marketplace of ideas and that the First Amendment does not
tolerate laws which cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.289
In the first category of cases teachers have expressed in
the classroom their personal opinions as individuals and not
as the teacher. Courts generally will protect teachers against
dismissal for merely expressing a personal viewpoint in the
classroom, so long as that expression is not the occasion for
material and substantial disruption of the school program, is
not truly inappropriate for classroom comment, and is not
part of a deliberate program of proselytization. Thus a
teacher was permitted to wear a black armband in his English
classes to protest against the Vietnam War." ' In another case
a teacher was protected from dismissal for refusing to partici-
pate in the flag salute ceremony opening the school day." 1 In
that case another teacher in the classroom did lead the tenth-
grade class in the ceremony, so there was no disruption of
the school's curriculum. In addition, the age of the pupils
helped assure their comprehension of the situation."' An Ar-
kansas federal district court upheld the right of a college
teacher to inform his class of his Communistic beliefs but
stressed there was no right to proselytize.' However, a biol-
ogy teacher was not protected from dismissal after speaking
in class about his experiences with prostitutes in Japan, after
he used a class to criticize in strong language his superinten-
dent, the school board, the school system, and to complain
238. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195-196 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). See, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350
U.S. 551 (1956).
239. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See,
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
240. James v. Board of Education of Central District No. 1, 461 F.2d
566 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
241. Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
242. C.f, Palmer v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 603 F.2d
1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
243. Cooper v. Russ, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
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about teacher salaries.' 4 ' Denial of tenure was upheld in an-
other case in which the teacher used the classroom as "his
personal forum to promote union activities, to sanction po-
lygamy, to attack marriage, to criticize other teachers, and to
sway and influence the mind of young people without full
proper explanation of both sides of the issues."24 ' Inveterate
use of profane language in a college class - "hell," "damn,"
"bullshit," "God damn," and "sucks" - which was some-
times directed in the form of ridicule at students was a
proper basis for dismissal.14" And a federal district court sus-
tained the dismissal of a fifth-grade teacher who violated a
board rule against classroom discussion of "any aspect of the
recent labor dispute. 2 47
A note of caution needs to be introduced at this point. In
a potentially far-reaching opinion the Sixth Circuit in Row-
land v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County,
Ohio,'4' upheld the dismissal of a teacher who told a secre-
tary, an assistant principal, and several teachers that she was
bisexual and had a female lover. The disclosure of her sexual
preference was not occasioned by any disruption. Neverthe-
less, the court held that since these comments were not a
matter of public concern,'" the First Amendment provided
her no protection. According to this court privately commu-
nicated and nondisruptive speech not touching on a matter of
public concern receives no protection in the school context.
244. Moore v. School Board, 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
245. Knarr v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832, 836 (N.D. Ind.
1970), af'd, 452 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971).
246. Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986). See, Fiscus v.
Board of School Trustees of Central School District of Greene County,
509 N.E.2d 1137 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1987).
247. Nigosian v. Weiss, 343 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
248. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1373
(1985). See, Terrell v. University of Texas System Police, 792 F.2d 1360
(5th Cir. 1986) in which dismissal of campus police officer was upheld on
the basis of his writing critical comments about his superior in a private
diary the contents of which, without the employee's knowledge, were
turned over to his superiors. The employee kept the diary after having
been relieved of his patrol duties and at a time when his supervisor was
being pressured to improve the deficiencies in his.department. The court
assumed without deciding that the diary was "speech" for First Amend-
ment purposes, but ruled that in the diary the employee was speaking as an
employee, not as a citizen, and the content of the diary was not a matter of
public concern. The fact the employee had not attempted to communicate
the contents of his diary to others underscored for the Court the fact that
this was a matter of personal concern only.
249. See supra note 248.
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Assuming the case represents current constitutional doctrine,
it suggests that teachers expressing personal views in the
classroom will only receive First Amendment protection if
their comments are not disruptive and are directed to mat-
ters of public concern. Putting aside the difficult question of
what constitutes material and substantial disruption, it be-
comes important to define the notion of "public concern." Is
a teacher who refuses to participate in the flag salute expres-
sing himself on a matter of public concern? Is informing the
class of attitudes toward patriotism a matter of public con-
cern? The answer would seem to be "yes" to both questions,
under a reasonably broad definition of the term. But if "pub-
lic concern" is narrowed to include, for example, only issues
under active discussion in some deliberative body, then these
teachers would not be protected.
The Sixth Circuit also demonstrated its conservatism in
Fowler v. Board of Education of Lincoln County, Kentucky.2 50 The
teacher arranged to have her class, comprised of students
aged fourteen through seventeen, see a movie, Pink Floyd -
The Wall, on a non-instruction day used for grading. The
movie contained a scene with some nudity, vulgar language,
an animated section depicting flowers turned to sex organs
engaging in an act of intercourse, and other segments involv-
ing rape, suggestions of oral sex, and a naked couple engag-
ing in foreplay and intercourse. The teacher had not
prescreened the movie, but having learned from a student
that one scene involved nudity, arranged to have something
held over the screen at that point in the film. Some students
claimed they saw some nudity at that point anyway. During
the showing of the film the teacher left the room for brief
period of time. She was dismissed from her job for insubordi-
nation and conduct unbecoming a teacher. 1 She filed suit
claiming that her dismissal violated her First Amendment
rights. She testified that she thought the film had significant
value because it "portrayed the dangers of alienation be-
tween people and of repressive educational systems," but she
did not discuss the film with her pupils for lack of time.""'
She also stated she showed the film because this day was the
students' "treat-type of day. '2 53 The district court concluded
250. 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 502 (1987).
251. Id. at 658.
252. Id. at 659-660.
253. Id. at 663.
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that the teacher's conduct was protected by the First Amend-
ment, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.
Although it seems obvious from the opinion that the
Sixth Circuit was concerned about the content of the film, it
did not explicitly base its decision on the impermissibility of
showing obscenity to minors in the class. Instead, the Court
found the First Amendment afforded no protection because
the teacher did not intend to convey a message with the
showing of the film, that this was not an act of expression.'"
Supporting the conclusion were the facts that she did not re-
view the film, left the class during the showing, did not dis-
cuss the film with the class, and showed it merely as a treat.
Precedent, said the Court, made clear the First Amendment
applied only when the activity was intended to express a mes-
sage that was likely to be understood.'" The Court also con-
cluded that reliance on academic freedom was misplaced be-
cause the teacher's conduct "was unrelated to the educational
process.""' The court apparently drew a distinction between
a teacher's desire to entertain the pupils, and a teacher who
has a "serious" educational purpose in conveying ideas. Ac-
cording to this court the First Amendment protects only the
latter purpose. Hence the teacher's intent must be examined
before considering the applicability of the First Amendment
and academic freedom. Whether this distinction can be made
and whether it should be made are questions put aside here.
It seems unlikely, however, that even if it agreed the film had
an instructional purpose, the Sixth Circuit would have pro-
tected her from dismissal given the sexually explicit content
of the film.
Cases in the second category address the disciplining of a
teacher for using methods or introducing materials that the
teacher intended to be part of the official curriculum. These
cases do not involve the expression of personal opinion, but
rather involve the teacher acting in an official capacity. To
the extent courts have recognized this dimension of academic
freedom, they have carefully circumscribed its scope. Aca-
demic freedom does not include control over the selection of
basic texts, selection of the method of instruction, authority
to change course content, or discretion to introduce obscen-
ity or near-obscenity into elementary-secondary class-
rooms."'" To the extent teachers receive constitutional pro-
254. Id. at 662.
255. Id. at 663.
256. Id. at 663 n. 6.
257. Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnson v.
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tection in deciding whether to introduce a controversial
novel or to adopt a controversial teaching method, courts
have given general guidelines limiting this discretion. The
board may discipline a teacher if it can establish that the
materials caused a material and substantial disruption, were
not relevant, were shocking or inappropriate, or did not
serve a serious educational purpose. The board would also be
justified in acting if the teacher employed these supplemen-
tary materials in a personal program of indoctrination. Using
such guidelines the courts have protected a teacher who dis-
cussed the word "uck" in class; assigned a serious article on
youth counter-culture using the word "motherfucker"; as-
signed Kurt Vonnegut's book Welcome to the Monkey House
that contained arguably vulgar material; used role playing to
teach about Reconstruction; assigned balanced materials in
civics class, including the teacher's personal views on the Vi-
etnam War and race relations; and showed films on human
sexuality objected to by some parents.'" In contrast, dismis-
sals were upheld when teachers introduced various articles,
poems and pictures dealing with the 1969 rock festival
"Woodstock" which talked about drugs, sex, and used vulgar
language. 59
These opinions supporting a teacher's limited right to
control what students read gain support from another line of
Supreme Court opinions. In these opinions the Court upheld
the right of individuals not to disseminate messages with
Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983); McElearney v. University of Illinois,
612 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1979); Gary v. Board of Education, 598 F.2d 535
(10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577
(6th Cir. 1976); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); Ahern v. Board of Education, 327 F. Supp.
1391 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Parducci v. Rut-
land, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See also, discussion of Board of
Education, Island Trees School District v. Pico, supra, text accompanying
notes 94-114.
258. Stachua v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on
single issue of damages, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986); Kingsville Ind. School Dis-
trict, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Mass.), affd on other grounds, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v.
Geanokos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School
District, 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 496
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala.
1970).
259. Brubaker v. Board of Education, School District 149, Cook Cty.,
I11., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), affd by an equally divided en banc court, 527
F.2d 611, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
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which they disagreed.'" Thus the Court has shown a sensitiv-
ity to government using its monopoly of coercive force to re-
quire individuals to breach their own values and sense of in-
tegrity. Again a cautionary note should be added. Some cases
suggest strong protection of a limited degree of teacher dis-
cretion to shape the classroom curriculum. A few straws in
the wind, however, suggest a more conservative trend in the
law. One such sign is the virtual unanimity of the justices in
Pico on the proposition that the state and school board has
complete discretion to shape the official curriculum. 6' An-
other sign is found in cases narrowing the scope of academic
freedom by excluding from it the authority to select the basic
textbook. 2 And a recent state court upheld the dismissal of
a teacher who assigned the book The Front Runner for a unit
on homosexual rights in a course on American minorities
when the teacher did not follow a policy requiring prior ap-
proval of the Superintendent.2 8 The court found federal
constitutional law placed control of instructional materials in
the hands of the school board.'" The court also noted that
the board could not "force racial bias or partisan political
preference into the classroom" nor "exclude an entire system
of respected human thought."26 5
The basic categories of cases support the idea that public
school teachers may introduce subversive ideas into their
classrooms. Cases in the first category clearly support the rule
that teachers may, within certain limits, express their per-
sonal opinions on the ideas and values that they have been
hired to teach. Applying this rule leads to the further conclu-
sion that teachers may, for example, express their doubts
about the rationality of always obeying the law. A teacher
might express a view that waiters and waitresses would be
foolish to report every tip or that it is irrational to drive the
260. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down state
requirement that prohibited motorists who objected to the state motto em-
bossed on the car's license plate from covering up the motto with tape);
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (barring a pub-
lic employee's union from spending dues required to be paid for political
activities not germane to the union's duties objected to by employees for
ideological reasons). See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). See also supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 105-14.
262. Cary v. Board of Education, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1978).
263. Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist. 704 P.2d 213
(Alaska 1985).
264. Id. at 217.
265. Id.
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speed limit. Even on a sensitive issue, such as avoiding the
draft during the Vietnam War, a teacher would be protected
in expressing his opinions. (The expression of racist opinions,
however, would probably not be protected speech, since this
form of expression would arguably violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so the board
would have a compelling interest to prevent the violation.'")
A teacher would cross the boundary of permissible behavior
if such comments were made as part of an effort to prosely-
tize. To proselytize, strictly speaking, is to seek to convert
someone to a religion, or more broadly, to a systematic body
of thought. In the classroom proselytizing might be viewed as
an effort to establish a certain orthodoxy the teacher pre-
ferred. But doing this is a far cry from a teacher personally
commenting on the school's official orthodoxy merely to raise
doubts or to warn pupils not to accept the school's own or-
thodoxy without subjecting it to critical examination. Hence,
teaching subversively is neither proselytizing nor attempting
to capture the students for an alternative orthodoxy; it is lib-
erating. The teacher remains within constitutional bounda-
ries by merely suggesting to pupils that they have freedom to
choose what to believe and that sometimes the "patriotic" or
"virtuous" response is not the rational response.
The opinions in the second category also support a
teacher's right, within certain limits, to introduce supplemen-
tary materials with subversive themes as a formal part of the
curriculum. Thus, a teacher of a "problems of democracy"
course would be within a constitutionally protected sphere of
discretion to assign an article sympathetically discussing the
perspective of the Vietnam draft avoider. Again, however,
the introduction of racist materials would provide a basis for
dismissal,2 7 and the prohibition against proselytization would
have to be followed.
Lower court precedent supports a teacher's right to be
subversive. But it is important to push further with the analy-
sis because the opinions are only those of lower courts, they
are not unanimous on this point, and they do not adequately
explore the reasons for acknowledging a constitutional right
to academic freedom. Goldstein argues that no such rationale
266. See Clarke v. Board of Education of School District of Omaha,
215 Neb. 250, 338 N.W.2d 272 (1983).
267. See Lowen v. Turnispeed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980);
Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La.
1970), affd, 448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971).
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is available. Dean Yudof responds to the challenge by arguing
in connection with parental rights, that the concept of aca-
demic freedom can be justified as a way of curbing govern-
ment overreaching - as a functional way of limiting govern-
ment's capacity, as operator of a near-monopoly in
educational services, to indoctrinate pupils and ultimately fal-
sify the consent upon which the democratic system of govern-
ment rests.2 8
As important as Dean Yudof's point is, it downplays the
individual interests of both pupil and teacher in academic
freedom. Academic freedom's value in a public school con-
text does lie in limiting government power, but it also serves
the pupil's interest in self-defense. Learning to question, to
develop a healthy skepticism, indeed, learning to be wary and
distrustful is important for survival. Learning that sometimes
it is rational to defect can be crucial. This distrust should
properly extend not only to the enticements of demagogues
but also to any claims that a particular governmental or eco-
nomic system is the best, that "political obligation" requires
Y, or that obedience to law is always required. The child's
interest in self-defense is entailed in the constitutionally pro-
tected notions of life, liberty and property. And, just as rec-
ognizing a parental right to educate subversively protects the
child's fundamental interest in self-defense, so does recogniz-
ing a teacher's interest in educating subversively.
In addition, the teacher also has a personal stake in the
right to academic freedom. In seeking to fulfill the noble
ideal of what it means to be a teacher, teachers will seek to
act as a friend toward their pupils, will want to avoid harming
their pupils, will want to avoid the lie associated with present-
ing materials in a way as though they agreed with the pro-
positions being presented, and will want to maintain their
own integrity.2 69 These are interests at the heart, not just of
the role of teacher, of what it means to be a person who re-
lates in a humane and giving way to other people, especially
those who are vulnerable and dependent. Dealing with stu-
dents in these terms is no mere product of adherence to some
abstract intellectual ideal. To reach out to protect the vulner-
able or to warn the gullible is a strong human instinct, part of
the human personality.
It might be objected that the subversive teacher may
268. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKs 213-218 (1983). See,
Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REv. 831 (1987).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 180-83.
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have no such humanitarian motives, indeed may have no real
interest in the well-being of the child, but acts only to achieve
some other political agenda. That may be true in some in-
stances, but it is also probably true that this teacher will
serve, perhaps unintentionally, the interests of the child in
survival. Hence, for reasons of child-protection per se, as op-
posed to protecting the interests of the teacher, academic
freedom is well-grounded.
The teacher's own interests are grounded in the Consti-
tution in several ways. First, the teacher's interest is clearly a
species of liberty - the liberty to be oneself and to realize
one's personality. As Professor Tribe has written, "[t]he Con-
stitution's is not a totalitarian design, depending for its suc-
cess upon the homogenization or depersonalization of hu-
manity."2 " The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is an obvious anchor for this interest, as is the
Ninth Amendment and as is the basic constitutional structure
which reflect a commitment to limited government, democ-
racy, and the right of people to live independent and private
lives. Second, the interest of the teacher to speak his own
views rather than being a mere mouthpiece of official views
falls within the ambit of the First Amendment's free speech
clause. Third, for some teachers, speaking subversively will
be religiously motivated. Thus, the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment may also offer protection. Fourth, one can
look generally to the "emanations" and "penumbras" and
"shadows" of the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments as elaborations of the blessings of liberty the Constitu-
tion was established to secure. 71
It could be argued that no matter how well-grounded in
the Constitution the teacher's interests are, no interests are
infringed when teacher and board consent to a contract that
a specific subject be taught in a specific way. But the prevail-
ing view is that government may not condition receipt of a
benefit, such as being hired to teach, upon waiver of constitu-
tional rights. 72 And in this case attaching conditions to the
270. TRIBE, supra note 93 at 1308.
271. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (Douglas, J. concur-
ring); Whelen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
272. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987); Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). C.f, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto




job - waiver of constitutional interests - imposes the con-
sequence that those who may best know the flaws in the
school's official program are denied the only meaningful op-
portunity they would have to convey that message to those
who are most likely to be hurt by those flaws. In terms of a
lost opportunity, permission to impose the condition of
waiver of constitutional interests may be more harmful than
would be a direct imposition of restrictions on the exercise of
constitutional rights by those not connected with govern-
ment. Stated differently, restricting citizens in general - in
violation of their clear First Amendment rights - from seek-
ing to convey to children the errors in the public school's
curriculum is not likely to have any real practical effect as to
what children learn; but conditioning access to teaching jobs
on the basis of the waiver of the same constitutional interest
will. It is doubtful children would be hearing what citizens
would be saying anyway, but gagging the teacher shuts off
one of the child's more important sources of information and
insights.
An opponent to this line of argument might concede
that teachers bring constitutionally protected interests into
the classroom yet argue that the state's interests in control-
ling teachers are so strong as to warrant infringement of
those interests. Yet what are these state interests? An interest
in total control of every word that passes the teacher's lips?'78
An interest in writing an all-governing script which tolerates
no deviations? Or is the state interest less controlling and
more one of assuring that its point of view is conveyed, even
conveyed with force? It would be difficult to maintain that a
democratic state may legitimately adopt as its purposes the
first two formulations. Democratic governments, resting on
the consent of the governed, do not have an interest which
permits its voice to dominate the conversation in the class-
room. 7' Thus only the third formulation of the state's pur-
pose is legitimate. And this purpose, taken on its own terms,
leaves room for alternative voices to enter the dialogue.
When this purpose is considered in the context of the
teacher's and the student's constitutional interests, it becomes
273. C.f, VAN GEEL, supra note 7 at 211-260. The argument is made
there that there is no empirically supported governmental interest in incul-
cating youth. Stated differently, the article demonstrates that social science
research does not support any of the state's arguments for a thorough go-
ing program of inculcation.
274. TRIBE, supra note 93 at 804-814; YUDOF, supra note 268.
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even clearer that room must be left for the subversive
teacher's voice in the classroom. Accommodating a properly
understood state interest with the interests of teacher and
student means nothing less than subversion must be permit-
ted in the public school classrooms.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the public education program is governed by the
logic of the prisoner's dilemma and the nature of public
goods. A certain form of education may be a public good,
and a governmental effort to provide this is justified. Yet
given the nature of the prisoner's dilemma, it is rational for
people to defect, and thus it is predictable that some people
will defect. One form of this defection is the provision of a
subversive education. Children have a need to know about
the reality of the prisoner's dilemma and parents and teach-
ers will seek to protect their children and pupils against the
possibility of becoming a prisoner's dilemma "sucker." The
child's interest in being protected and the parents' and teach-
ers' interests in protecting the child are moral rights. These
are constitutionally anchored and should receive constitu-
tional protection. One way to provide this protection is to
recognize the right of parents to educate their children pri-
vately and subversively and to recognize a limited right of ac-
ademic freedom for public school teachers to introduce the
cautions associated with a subversive education into the pub-
lic school classroom.
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